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Abstract 
Recent retrospectives of classic psychology articles by Meehl (1978) and Wachtel (1980), 
concerning problems with psychology’s research paradigm, have been viewed by 
commentators, on the whole, as germane as when first published. However, no similar 
examination of Lykken’s (1991) classic criticisms of psychology’s dominant research 
tradition has been undertaken. Twenty years on, this thesis investigates whether Lykken’s 
criticisms and conclusions are still valid via an exposition of three contentious issues in 
psychological science: the measurement problem, null hypothesis significance testing, 
and the granularity of research methods. Though finding that little progress has been 
made, Observation Oriented Modelling is advanced as a promising methodological 
solution for improving psychological research.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Classic Articles 
Retrospectives 
In recent years, two retrospectives of classic psychology articles have appeared in 
Applied and Preventative Psychology. The first, published in 2004, reprinted and 
commented on Paul Meehl’s (1978) seminal article from the Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology: “Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and 
the slow progress of soft psychology”. The second, published in 2007 and reprinted with 
comments, was Paul Wachtel’s (1980) American Psychologist essay, “Investigation and 
its discontents: Some constraints on progress in psychological research”. Although 
elucidating, analysing, and appraising different issues, both authors lamented the state of 
psychological research.  
Meehl 
Twenty Difficulties with Psychology 
Meehl’s article began with a discussion of twenty problems in “scientizing the human 
mind” (Meehl, 1978, p.808). Everything from units of measurement, ethical constraints, 
and context dependent stochastologicals1 to idiographic methodologies and the import of 
cultural factors were documented. In so doing, Meehl offered “one of the most incisive 
reviews of the problems inherent in studying complex psychological phenomena in 
existence” (Hinshaw, 2004, p.39). However, this was not the article’s only contribution. 
The Feeble Practice 
The central postulate “particularly hammered home” (Miller, 2004, p.62), and “the 
lasting memory most readers have” (Hinshaw, 2004, p.40), concerned the critique of 
significance testing. Highlighting the trivial, but statistically significant, differences 
between means of large samples, Meehl demonstrated that the null hypothesis is quasi-
                                                           
1 Meehl uses this term to describe the probabilistic laws that undergird psychological conceptualisation, in 
contrast with the strict law-like inference given by the term nomological when applied in the natural 
sciences. 
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always false: “Putting it crudely, if you have enough cases and your measures are not 
totally unreliable, the null hypothesis will always be falsified, regardless of the truth of 
the substantive theory” (Meehl, 1978, p.822; italics in original). As a result, 
psychological hypotheses are subjected to only “feeble danger” (p.821) of refutation; 
psychological theories become like old generals; “they never die, they just slowly fade 
away” (p.807), and psychological science “shows a disturbing absence of that cumulative 
character that is so impressive in disciplines like astronomy, molecular biology, and 
genetics.” (p.807; italics in original). 
Wachtel 
The Predilection with Experimentation and Theoretical Laxity 
Psychological theory also came in for criticism in Wachtel’s (1980) article, though for 
entirely different reasons. The lack of recognition, encouragement, and opportunity for 
theoretical psychologists, and an over-reliance on experimental work, to the detriment of 
observational and conceptual undertaking, were cited as the most prominent problems. 
Wachtel contended that in combination they constituted “a kind of intellectual Gresham’s 
law” (Wachtel, 1980, p.401), wherein bad practice had driven out good theorizing. 
Bemoaning the resulting “misleading findings and one-sided conceptualizations” (p. 
407), Wachtel echoed sentiments famously expressed by Wittgenstein: “in psychology 
there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.132).  
The Perils of Productivity 
Going further, Wachtel identified pecuniary incentives and researcher output as 
additional issues exacerbating the problem of poor psychological theorizing. In warning 
of the distorting role of grants that drive research programs, along with problems inherent 
in an overemphasis on publication quantity, rather than publication quality, Wachtel 
“accurately foretold the future of our field” (Ceci & Williams, 2007, p.14). When the 
focus on publication quantity and incentive issues are amalgamated with the preceding 
concerns with theoretical laxity, Wachtel concluded an “industrial model of intellectual 
endeavour” (p .403) had been created that encouraged “activity at the expense of thought” 
(p.399; italics in original), a conclusion noted as “remarkably contemporary” (Cuthbert, 
2007, p.15), and striking in its “prescience and timeliness” (Lilienfeld, 2007, p.1). 
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Retrospective Summary 
It should be noted that the articles of both Meehl and Wachtel are not without criticism. 
In laying the blame for the deficiencies of significance testing solely at the feet of Ronald 
Fisher, Meehl overlooked the contributions of Jerzy Neyman and Ergon Pearson to the 
currently used, hybridised, methodology (Gigerenzer, 2004). Similarly, Wachtel’s 
argument, concerning the dangers of valuing research quantity over quality, is somewhat 
blunted by research showing the most prolific authors have the highest, as well as the 
lowest, quality of research output (Kazdin, 2007; Simonton, 2004).  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, it is a telling and somewhat distressing indictment of 
the state of psychological science that both articles have been viewed by commentators, 
on the whole, as being as germane now as when first published (Hinshaw, 2004; 
Lilienfeld, 2007; Wakefield, 2007; Walker & Mittal, 2007; Waller, 2004; Wampold, 
2004). Though overlapping to a small degree, the issues outlined in both articles can be 
seen as largely complementary. Whereas Meehl exposed the collective failure of 
psychologists to subject theories to rigorous tests, Wachtel emphasised “in one way or 
another…the reward structure of our field” (Wachtel, 1980, p.399). Taken together, 
Meehl and Wachtel’s arguments are cogent and conclusive. The unsatisfactory progress 
of psychology is a direct result of both the dominant research tradition, and the 
institutional structures that buttress it.  
Lykken 
Bad Tradition 
The view that problems in psychology can be attributed to the research tradition and 
accompanying support structure is also advanced by David Lykken. In his now classic 
1991 essay, “What’s wrong with psychology anyway?”, he continued where Meehl and 
Wachtel had left off. Citing depressing figures concerning the number of successful grant 
applications, journal rejection rates, and the contribution to cumulative knowledge of 
published articles along with article author and readership rates, Lykken concluded that 
something is wrong with the established research tradition in psychology. So much so 
that “It is hard to avoid the conclusion that psychology is a kind of shambling, poor 
relation of the natural sciences” (Lykken, 1991, p.14). 
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Castles in the Sand 
Like Meehl, in whose honour the essay was written, Lykken characterised the lack of 
cumulative development of theory in psychology as “just this year’s ant hill, most of 
which will be abandoned and washed away in another season” (p.7), with null hypothesis 
significance testing, “the favourite ritual” (p.30). Using three historical examples, he also 
demonstrated that much psychological research fails to replicate before he asserted that 
the substantial work in psychology over the last hundred years was more neuroscience 
than psychology. Additionally, in echoing Feynman’s (1986) sentiment, whereby 
psychologists copy the form, but not the substance, of the natural sciences, Lykken 
contended psychology exists as a “Cargo-cult science”2 (p.13). 
Not Quite the Ailing Lady 
Despite his “idiosyncratic and sometimes overstated” critique (Lykken, 1991, p.37), 
Lykken’s message was not all negative. Finding little evidence that psychologists are 
cognitively inferior to their natural science cousins, acknowledging that experimental 
control is very difficult, and that the human mind encapsulates the most complicated 
mechanism known to man, Lykken asserted that psychology is “more difficult, more 
intractable, than other disciplines” (p.15). Although contending that psychologists have 
“an abundance of bad habits” (p.29), the good news was that every bad habit jettisoned 
would improve psychological research. To this end, Lykken nominated the overuse of 
scientific jargon and over-reliance on significance testing as but two, prominent bad 
habits (Lykken, 1991). 
Although offering methods for improvement, and expressing hope for future research, 
Lykken’s general theme is not oversold. In examining and extending the work of earlier 
contributors, Lykken showed psychology, and more particularly, its predominant research 
tradition to be anathema to scientific advancement. Though both Meehl and Wachtel’s 
articles have stood the test of time, one might wonder whether twenty years on, given 
improvements in both technology and methodology, Lykken’s suppositions still hold 
true? 
                                                           
2 This is an analogy referring to a tribe that observes cargo arriving during wartime and who try to duplicate 
the results after war’s end by building an airport, control towers, and antennae out of bamboo. Although 
everything looks the same, the planes fail to land.  
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Thesis Overview 
Outline and Aims 
This thesis answers the question of whether Lykken’s critique is still valid by undertaking 
a theoretical exposition of three critical issues addressed respectively by Meehl, Wachtel, 
and Lykken. Specifically, the thesis updates, synthesises, and evaluates the theoretical 
and methodological issues surrounding: the measurement of psychological constructs, the 
role of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) in theory evaluation, and the tension 
between the search for general laws and the understanding of individual cases in 
psychology. In addition, the new statistical methodology of Observation Oriented 
Modeling (OOM) is evaluated as a means of alleviating, and/or avoiding many of the 
problems associated with each issue.  
Although the recent retrospective commentaries on the articles by Meehl and Wachtel 
are valuable contributions, in targeting one article each, only a restricted evaluation of 
some of the critical issues in psychology was articulated. Taking advantage of more 
contemporary work and possessing fewer word and time constraints than journal articles, 
this thesis undertakes a deeper, more detailed, and integrated analysis of each of the 
issues. Furthermore, in documenting and evaluating OOM as a prospective 
methodological nostrum, the thesis makes a new and unique contribution to the 
psychology literature. Further details, including the chapter outlines, are summarised 
below.  
The Measurement of Psychological Constructs 
The majority of contemporary psychometricians stand by the definition of measurement 
formulated by Stevens in 1946, namely, that measurement is the assignment of numerals 
to objects or events according to rule (Michell, 1997). However, few psychometricians 
are aware that this definition emerged in response to the findings of the Ferguson 
Committee, which opined that psychophysical methods did not constitute scientific 
measurement (Ferguson et al., 1940). Despite its now widespread acceptance, Stevens’ 
definition of measurement is not without criticism, and Chapter 2 investigates the 
  What’s Still Wrong with Psychology Anyway? 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 6
conceptual and theoretical problems with it, and with psychological measurement in 
general.  
The chapter begins with an historical overview documenting early contributions on the 
issue from such luminaries as James McKeen Cattell, Edward Lee Thorndike, and Gustav 
Fechner. This exposition provides the backdrop for the analysis of the Ferguson 
Committee’s findings and Stevens’ subsequent response. Drawing from the more recent 
work of Michell (1999; 1997), the problems with Stevens’ definition are delineated, 
particularly its failure to satisfy the quantitative axioms formulated by Holder (1901) and 
the philosophical issues surrounding operationism.  
From there, the chapter explores two alternatives to the traditional approach to 
measurement, those of Rasch modelling and the theory of conjoint measurement. An 
analysis of the empirical task in quantification is elucidated next via an appraisal of the 
recent argument presented by Trendler (2009). Consistent with the contentions of both 
Michell (1999, 1997) and Trendler (2009), I conclude that psychology, in all but a few 
instances, has failed to prove that its measurement regime is quantitative and is unlikely 
to be so in future. Evaluating three options, I suggest that without more interest in 
conjoint measurement theory, non-quantitative statistical analysis tools such as OOM 
represent the best conceptual value moving forward.  
Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
Though Sir Ronald Fisher is commonly credited with popularising significance testing, 
little is recognised of the influence William Sealy Gosset had on the early development of 
statistics used in psychology (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). Beginning with Gosset, a 
historical exposition traces the development of null hypothesis significance testing that 
includes the contributions of Sir Ronald Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, and Egon Pearson. The 
hybridised methodology employed by psychologists today is shown to be an 
incompatible marriage of convenience of competing statistical philosophies.  
Examining the assumptions underpinning the modern hybridised NHST methodology, 
the conceptual and logical inadequacies of such a statistical amalgamation are delineated. 
Meehl’s conjecture, sequence effects, and Lindley’s paradox are but several prominent 
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examples. The contention that NHST can and should be employed as a method for 
assessing sampling uncertainty is also evaluated and rejected.   
Subsequently, contemporary findings on the growth of NHST, attempts at statistical 
reform, and the level of understanding of significance testing within the psychological 
fraternity are tabled and evaluated. In conclusion, I contend that despite being the most 
popular tool for statistical inference, significance testing is largely misunderstood, and 
misapplied within the domain of psychology; with only rare exceptions should it be 
employed as a research methodology. 
Interindividual versus Intraindividual Research 
The research tradition that overwhelmingly characterises contemporary psychological 
science is one that focuses on the analysis of groups of individuals via statistical 
aggregates. This interindividual (IEV) research paradigm contrasts with intraindividual 
(IAV) approaches which emphasise that idiosyncratic patterns of variability within a 
person are the fundamental level of analysis from which to build generalised 
psychological knowledge. Though commonly characterised as an idiographic-nomothetic 
debate, the chapter begins with a definitional assay illustrating how, in drifting from the 
philosopher Windelband’s original conception, a spurious distinction between the terms 
idiographic and nomothetic has permeated psychology’s research tradition.  
The historical development of the rise of IEV at the expense of IAV research is 
subsequently detailed. It is shown that “the triumph of the aggregate” arose from the 
conquest of the Galtonian over the Wundtian research philosophies, with causal factors 
including developments in statistics along with educational, military, and social demand 
for practical applications of psychological science. Statistics demonstrating the change in 
fortunes of each research approach are also presented that serve to highlight the serious 
imbalance of research perspectives that exists within contemporary psychology.  
A critical exposition of the strengths and weaknesses of IEV and IAV methods is 
presented next. Whereas, many of the common criticisms of IAV research are shown to 
be erroneous and ill-founded, the many touted benefits of IEV research are shown to be 
premised on dubious conceptual assumptions. Ergodic mathematical theory and empirical 
research prove that what is common to an aggregate cannot describe that which is 
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common to an individual. I conclude that redress of the fundamental research imbalance 
between IEV and IAV research pervading psychology is the only remedy that will allow 
for the construction of substantive, cumulative, and generalised psychological 
knowledge.  
Observation Oriented Modeling 
Observation Oriented Modeling is a novel statistical methodology created by James Grice 
and founded on the moderate realist philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle (Grice, 
2011). Emphasising the primacy of real, repeatable, observable, non-aggregated events, 
OOM seeks to create integrated models that accurately and consistently explain scientific 
phenomena. Using binary transformations of ordered data elements, termed deep 
structures, sets of observations can be mapped onto one another to infer causal linkages 
via Binary Procrustes Rotation. Predicated on the rejection of traditional positivist 
methodologies such as NHST, OOM represents an alternative methodology for analysing 
data and evaluating hypotheses (Grice, 2011).  
The chapter begins with an articulation of the rationale undergirding OOM. The 
technical and statistical elements unique to OOM analysis are elucidated subsequently 
and include topics concerning matrix rotation, randomised resampling, and 
generalisation. A hypothetical example follows that illustrates the matrix algebra 
operations of OOM analysis, and presents statistical outputs from the OOM software, 
before benefits and criticisms of OOM are considered. In focusing on observations rather 
than generalities, without relying on assumptions of continuous quantitative 
measurement, or those assumptions particular to NHST, I contend that OOM is uniquely 
suited to addressing several problems resulting from psychology’s dominant research 
paradigm. 
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Chapter 2: The Measurement Problem 
Early History of Psychological Measurement 
Early Antecedents 
Although some form of test or competition has probably been invoked since time 
immemorial to compare and distinguish between the abilities of humans, the earliest 
evidence of psychological testing and measurement originates in China (Kaplan & 
Saccuzzo, 2005). Historical records indicate that oral examinations were given in China 
every third year in order to help determine work evaluation and promotion decisions, as 
early as 4000 years ago. The Han Dynasty3, used test batteries in the fields of civil law, 
agriculture, geography and military affairs, and it is likely the western world learned 
about testing mental abilities from the Chinese (DuBois, 1966, 1970). Letters from 
British missionaries in 1832, for example, encouraged the English East India Company to 
copy the Chinese system of selecting employees for overseas assignment. Indeed, it was 
the success of the testing system for the English East India Company that led to the 
British government adopting a similar regime for its civil service in 1855 (Kaplan & 
Saccuzzo, 2005).  
The inception of modern psychology is commonly dated toward the end of 1879, when 
Wilhelm Wundt designated space at the University of Leipzig for psychological 
experimentation, however, it is often overlooked that Wundt was the most significant 
disciple of Gustav Fechner (Michell, 1999). There had been earlier attempts to found a 
quantitative psychology, most notably by Johann Friedrich Herbart, who tried to develop 
mathematical models of the mind, and E. H. Weber, who attempted to demonstrate the 
existence of a psychological threshold. However, it was Fechner who was successful, in 
that the science of psychology grew from his undertakings, and the publication of 
Elemente der Psychophysik in 1860, can be seen as the foundation stone of modern 
psychology, both quantitative and experimental (Michell, 1999). 
                                                           
3 206 B.C.E to 220 C.E. 
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Fechner 
Psychophysics 
The goal of psychophysical measurement, as conceived by Fechner, was to quantify the 
intensity of sensations (Fechner, 1860). It was driven by a rejection of Descartes’ dualist 
contention that the mental is not material. Instead, Fechner believed that mind and body 
were composed of only one substance that could be cognitively related to in two ways, 
via sensory observation or introspection. It was via the former method, “the common 
subordination of both the mental and physical realms to the principal of mathematical 
determination” (Fechner, 1887, p.213), that Fechner hoped to found an exact theory of 
body and mind relation. 
Fechner’s first supposition was that a physical stimulus acted upon the nervous system 
in a manner proportional to magnitude. Presuming that the intensity of sensation was a 
logarithmic function of the strength of the neural effect, Fechner concluded that stimulus 
and sensation were related logarithmically (Michell, 1999). However, proving this 
required a method for establishing the equality of sensation differences. Not believing 
that subjects could directly judge the quantitative structure of their perceptions, Fechner 
came up with an experimental method to indirectly measure sensations.  
Presenting elements from stimulus sets two at a time, Fechner asked subjects to report 
which of the pair was greater in some magnitude, for example, which of two weights was 
heavier. Repeating this procedure many times under controlled conditions, and with 
varying elements, allowed Fechner to determine the value of a just noticeable difference 
for a given stimulus pair. Invoking an additional premise, that the just noticeable 
differences for different stimulus magnitudes corresponded to equal sensation differences, 
Fechner was able to show that the intensity of any sensation in a series was measured by 
the number of just noticeable differences between the stimulus producing it and the 
minimum stimulus threshold (Michell, 1997). 
Criticism 
Criticism of Fechner’s approach was extensive and varied. Bergson rejected the idea that 
sensations could even be ordered let alone measured. German psychologists such as 
Delboeuf, Ebbinghaus and Muller contended that Fechner’s methods measured only the 
magnitude of sensation distances and not intensity of sensations. However, it was von 
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Kries who was one of the most vociferous dissenters (Michell, 1999). Arguing that it was 
impossible to determine that one pain was exactly10 times stronger than another, von 
Kries rejected as meaningless the claim that distinct sensation differences were equal.  
Whereas von Kries believed intensive physical quantities such as velocity, force, and 
pressure could be measured via fixing them relative to extensive physical quantities like 
length, time, and mass, he thought Fechner’s fixing of just noticeable differences to equal 
sensation differences for intensive psychological quantities was arbitrary, with no 
possibility of being proven correct or incorrect (Michell, 1997). Von Kries’ objection 
faltered, however, as he could do little to prove the difference between the physical and 
psychological cases, a fact Fechner, famously, was only too happy to acknowledge: “all 
philosophical counter-demonstrations are, I think, mere writing in the sand' (Fechner, 
1887, p.215). 
Conclusion 
In the end, Fechner’s approach became the established psychological modus operandi 
(Michell, 1997). Despite the great philosophical nervousness of his critics, Fechner’s 
methods proved to be too valuable practically for those wishing to adhere to a 
quantitative imperative in investigating psychophysical phenomena. As will be illustrated 
further below, the theme of researcher pragmatism overwhelming philosophical 
reservations continues to this day.  
Cattell 
Mental Testing 
James McKeen Cattell was one of the earliest designated professors of psychology in the 
United States and had a great influence on the development of American psychology 
(Boring, 1957). Studying under Galton, a cousin of Darwin, Cattell’s doctoral dissertation 
of 1886 was based on Galton’s work on individual differences in reaction times. The first 
to coin the term mental test, Cattell wrote a number of pivotal papers (Cattell, 1890, 
1893) that widened the scope of psychology from psychophysics toward the study of 
intellectual abilities (Michell, 1999). 
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Like many of his contemporaries, Cattell held a monistic4 conviction that mental 
capacities were intricately linked with physical aspects. So much so that the first mental 
test he developed included tasks such as the pressure exerted by a hand squeeze on a 
dynamometer and the time taken to move the right arm 50 centimetres (Cattell, 1890). He 
provided justification for this conviction in his later writings, opining that no difference 
could be made between mental and physical energy (Cattell, 1902). 
The Quantitative Imperative 
Like Fechner before him, Cattell believed quantification to be of the utmost importance. 
Defining measurement as the determination of a magnitude in a standard unit, he saw the 
ratio as the basis for all measurement (Cattell, 1902). Further, he believed that such 
measurement was the only way for psychology to advance and attain the certainty and 
precision of the physical sciences (Cattell, 1890). 
 Ironically, it was one of Cattell’s own students, Clark Wissler who dealt the final blow 
to the psychophysical approach for measuring intelligence. Wissler calculated the 
correlations between different psychophysical measures of intelligence and found them 
too low to be practically useful (Beins, 2010). In another parallel with Fechner, Cattell 
used pragmatism to justify the conceptual deficiencies of his methods: “It may be at 
present pseudo-science, in that sense that we have drawn conclusions without adequate 
knowledge, but it is none the less the best we can do in the way of the application of 
systematised knowledge to the control of human nature” (Cattell, 1904, p.186). 
Conclusion 
Though Cattell’s approach to psychophysical methods for measuring intelligence 
ultimately proved futile, he stimulated and perpetuated forces that ultimately led to 
modern psychometrics (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2005). A notable example was his 
supervision of another student’s dissertation at Columbia University in 1898, one Edward 
Lee Thorndike.  
                                                           
4 Monism is the conviction that mental and physical phenomena are fundamentally composed of the same 
singular essence (Feser, 2005). 
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Thorndike 
Credo 
Thorndike’s first major contribution, after completing his doctorate under Cattell in 1898, 
was the 1904 publication of An Introduction to the Theory of Mental and Social 
Measurement. This book would go on to become a classic in the field and is still seen as a 
remarkably sophisticated text (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2005). Building on the work, and 
following the quantitative and practicalist imperatives of his forebears, Thorndike 
famously declared: “Whatever exists at all exists in some amount. To know it thoroughly 
involves knowing its quantity as well as its quality…We have faith also that the objective 
products produced, rather than the inner condition of the person whence they spring, are 
the proper point of attack for the measurer…the nature of educational measurements is 
the same as that of all scientific measurements.” (Thorndike, 1918, p.16-17). With this 
statement, Thorndike ushered in a new way of conceptualising psychological 
measurement (Michell, 1999). 
Objective Products 
Though admitting psychological measurement instruments had improved since Fechner’s 
time, Thorndike highlighted three fundamental defects that remained, namely, those of 
ambiguity in content, arbitrariness of units, and ambiguity in significance (Thorndike, 
1924, p.219). That is, Thorndike thought that because items in a test might differ in level 
of difficulty, an observed score was potentially a sum of different magnitudes and thus, 
not quantitative. Believing a change in focus, from inner sensations of the person to 
objective outputs produced, was required, Thorndike proposed measurement by relative 
position as the best way forward. In Thorndike’s opinion, it was misleading to judge 
abilities from casual observations and measures of only a few individuals. Instead, 
Thorndike believed it was only from a comparison to the total distribution of all 
individuals that some semblance of value was obtained (Thorndike, 1918). 
Practicalism and the Protégé 
Having already previously stated that measurement by relative position gave as true a 
measurement as by a direct unit of amount (Thorndike, 1904), Thorndike drew heavy 
criticism - most notably, Boring (1920), who claimed Thorndike’s method reduced 
  What’s Still Wrong with Psychology Anyway? 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 14 
psychology to operations of mere rank ordering. Once again, practicalism5 was latched 
onto as a defence by pro measurement psychologists. The view expressed by Truman Lee 
Kelley, Thorndike’s protégé and for some years America’s leading psychologist-
statistician (Michell, 1999), is a clear expression of practicalism: “Our mental tests 
measure something, we may or may not care what, but it is something which it is to our 
advantage to measure, for it augments our knowledge of what people can be counted 
upon to do in future. The measuring device as a measure of something that is desirable to 
measure comes first, and what it is a measure of comes second” (Kelley & Shen, 1929, 
p.86).  
Conclusion 
Several themes are readily apparent in the development of psychological measurement 
from Fechner through Cattell to Thorndike and Kelley. 
Monism 
Firstly, monism, the belief that the mental and the physical were of the same singular 
essence, was the default metaphysical stance for all of the early developers. The adoption 
of such a position inherently implied and allowed for the measurement of the mental, via 
the physical. Fechner’s just noticeable differences and the physical tasks in Cattell’s 
mental tests are two germane examples. 
Quantification 
Secondly, the emphasis on quantification, and the desire to adhere to principles of 
empirical investigation similar to those used in the natural sciences, was the driving force 
behind the methodological developments of each contributor. The effects of this were 
two fold. Attention shifted from metaphysical concerns to instrumental ones and issues 
with measurement gradually became assimilated to statistical issues. Thorndike’s 
measurement by relative position, and Kelley’s assertion that psychometric theory was a 
branch of statistics (Michell, 1999), provide solid illustration of this shift. 
                                                           
5 Practicalism is the term Michell (1997) uses to describe a view that science should pursue practical ends. 
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Practicalism 
Finally, when confronted at each turn with either metaphysical or empirical opposition to 
their work, practicalism was the de rigeur defence of measurement methods. That is, the 
value of information extracted about human abilities via measurement was thought to 
outweigh any methodological or conceptual objection. Indeed, as seen later, this thought 
remains a common fall back position to this day. 
The 1940s Watershed  
The Ferguson Committee 
An Extensive Foundation 
Through the 1920s, debate continued to rage around the practices of psychological 
measurement as ever more measurement instruments were designed, implemented, and 
analysed. Though American psychology, particularly its measurement regime, was under 
attack, psychology in Britain was even more vulnerable. As late as 1939, there were only 
six chairs of psychology in all of England and psychology did not gain a substantial 
foothold in English universities prior to the Second World War (Michell, 1999). It was 
perhaps no surprise then that the measurement issue came to a head in Britain with the 
convening of the Ferguson Committee. 
Established at York, in 1932, the British Association for the Advancement of Science 
appointed 19 psychologists and scientists to debate the merits of the possibility of 
quantitative estimates of sensory events (Ferguson et al., 1940). Propelled by the views of 
prominent philosophers of physics, particularly N.R. Campbell (1920, 1928) and Percy 
Bridgman (1927), it was commonly held by the scientific community of the time that 
measurement was necessarily extensive in nature. That is, physical measures were 
predicated on the A-magnitudes of mass, length and time. All other measures, such as the 
B-magnitudes of momentum, density, and temperature, were seen as derived, being mere 
manipulations of products of the fundamental A units (Narens & Luce, 1986). As 
psychophysics was commonly held to have no fundamental units, numerical operations 
such as concatenation could not be performed. Thus, it was believed by detractors that 
measurement in psychophysics was impossible (Borsboom, 2005; Michell, 1999). 
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The Nature of Measurement 
The scientific camp, led by Campbell, easily won the debate but the case against the 
possibility of measurement in psychology was not conclusive (Borsboom, 2005; Michell, 
1999). The opposing positions were perhaps best exemplified by Guild (1938) and Craik 
(1940). The former, a physicist, thought using the term measurement to apply to 
psychological practices destroyed all meaning of the word. Craik, on the other hand, 
emphasised the overly restrictive definition in the physical case: “It is important not to 
base the definition of measurement only on the most stringent instances, such as length; 
for ‘measurement’ is applied to scales of temperature, density, time etc., which fail to 
fulfil one or other of the conditions which are fulfilled by length.” (1940, p.343).  
 What the Ferguson report (Ferguson et al., 1940) really served to highlight was the 
importance of the definition of measurement. As part of the report, Stevens’ sone scale of 
loudness had been debated as an example of putative psychophysical measurement. 
Stevens, therefore, had an intense interest in its critique and it spurred him to propose a 
new definition of measurement. It was a definition that would radically alter the common 
conceptions of measurement in psychology (Michell, 1997). 
Stevens’ Definition of Measurement 
Subjective Quantification 
Like earlier psychologists, Stevens endorsed the importance of quantification opining that 
the history of science was nothing more than man’s search for procedures to measure and 
quantify the world around him (Stevens, 1967). However, unlike Fechner, Stevens 
believed subjects were capable of quantifying the nature of their sensations. The secret, 
he believed, relied on satisfying two conditions. Firstly, adopting a scale of true 
numerical magnitude and secondly, showing that the scale bore a reasonable relation to 
the experience of the observer (Stevens, 1936b). 
With the first condition, Stevens believed that if the numbers of a scale were amenable 
to arithmetic, the result should cohere with a set of physical conditions. As an example, 
he contrasted the cases of length, in which two lots of 3 centimetres combined equalled 6 
centimetres, with that of electrical induction in which doubling the length of a wire did 
not double the inductance (Stevens, 1936b). With respect to the later condition, Stevens 
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believed that so long as the magnitude of a stimulus designated N by a subject was half as 
great as the magnitude designated 2N, the scale was satisfactory (Stevens, 1936b). 
Should both conditions be met, as he believed true of his sone scale of loudness, then 
measurement was the result: “Provided a consistent rule is followed, some form of 
measurement is achieved.” (Stevens, 1959, p.19). 
Representationalism and the Four Scales 
The form of measurement was one of Stevens’ key themes. He believed measurement 
was possible only because some degree of isomorphism existed between empirical 
relations among properties of objects, and the properties of the number system. As such, 
Stevens proposed that measurement was predicated on four different scales with differing 
permissible mathematical operations. The result was the construction of the now famous 
nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio scales, and their respective operations of identity, 
order, difference, and equality (Stevens, 1946).  
As noted by Michell (1997), this reconstruction of measurement effectively disarmed 
Campbell and other dissenters on the Ferguson committee of their staunchest weapon, 
i.e., the claim that relevant additive relations between sensory intensities were not 
demonstrable. It also wedded Stevens’ scales to the popular statistical methodology of the 
Pearson-Fisherian tradition, virtually guaranteeing widespread adoption (Grice, 2011). 
However, if Stevens’ representationalism6 was correct, then, given a realist view7 of 
empirical structures, Stevens had another hurdle to surmount, i.e., the logically prior issue 
of whether relations of the required kind held in a given empirical domain (Michell, 
1999). If Stevens’ initial reconstruction was masterful, his second could only be 
described as extremely intrepid. 
Operationism 
Invoking a definition of operationism espoused by Bridgman (1927), one of 
psychophysics’ staunchest critics, Stevens constructed an operational interpretation of 
representational number theory. Agreeing with Bridgman that the meaning of a concept 
was synonymous with the operations used to identify it, Stevens concluded that the 
                                                           
6 Representationalism is the view that measurement involves the numerical representation and assignment 
to empirical relational structures. 
7 Realism mandates that there is an independently existing natural world which humans are able to 
successfully cognize via observational methods, at least sometimes. 
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empirical relations represented numerically in measurement must likewise be defined by 
the operations used to identify them. In doing so, Stevens replaced the prevailing natural 
science attitude of realism with a form of relativistic subjectivism (Michell, 1997). 
Stevens’ justification came primarily from two sources. The first was Einstein’s 
repudiation of the classical physics’ concepts of absolute time and absolute space 
(Stevens, 1935b). The second was the domain of mathematics and the rules and symbols 
used to represent discriminable aspects of nature. Combined, they formed the basis for 
Stevens’ famous dictum: “with the ultimate decoupling of the formal, arbitrary, empty, 
game like aspects of mathematics from the empirical pursuits of the "concrete" 
disciplines it became clear that the province of measurement extends to wherever our 
ingenuity can contrive systematic rules for pinning numbers on things. The number 
system is merely a model, to be used in whatever way we please. It is a rich model, to be 
sure, and one or another aspect of its syntax can often be made to portray one or another 
property of objects or events. It is a useful convention, therefore, to define as 
measurement the assigning of numbers to objects or events in accordance with a 
systematic rule.” (Stevens, 1959, p.609, italics added for emphasis). 
Conclusion 
Inversion via Operationism 
In adopting a thoroughgoing representationalism, and giving it an operationist 
interpretation, Stevens turned the classical definition of measurement on its head. The 
classical concept asserted that numerical measurements supervene on quantitative 
attributes. That is, if an attribute had the right kind of structure, then numerical measures 
were intrinsic to it. According to Stevens, however, this was incorrect; measurable 
attributes supervene on numerical assessment. If a consistent process could be created for 
assigning numbers to objects then measurement was achieved. 
Overriding Acceptance 
By appealing to conceptions of measurement held by his harshest critics, such as 
Bridgman, and cheekily reinterpreting definitions of others, such as Campbell (1920), 
Stevens deflected the criticisms of the Ferguson Committee (Michell, 1999). By also 
incorporating the dominant statistical tradition into the conception of measurement, 
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Stevens provided psychologists with a justification for their measurement practices, one 
which they were only too happy to accept. Indeed, the contrast of definitions prior to 
1951 with those coming after could not be more striking, with the classical conception of 
measurement almost unseen after 1951. Instead, a variation of Stevens’ form prevails, 
namely, that measurement is the assignment of numerals to observations according to 
rule (Michell, 1997). 
To this day, the standard definition of measurement in psychology, the one that 
undergirds traditional approaches to quantifying human abilities, is that of Stevens. As 
noted by Michell (1999), Stevens’ definition is so entrenched that Stevens’ dictum is 
often paraphrased without any acknowledgement that the idea originated with him. That 
this should be so, coupled with the fact that Stevens’ definition of measurement has 
remained more or less unchanged for more than 50 years, is a testament to its durability. 
Stevens’ definition is, however, uniquely at odds with the common conception of 
measurement in other sciences, and one might wonder whether this schism is justified?  
The Problem with the Modern Definition of 
Measurement 
The Classical Conception of Measurement 
Definition and Premises 
The classical concept of measurement asserts that all measurable attributes are 
quantitative and rests on two premises: first, that measurement depends on ratios; and 
second, that quantitative attributes are the only attributes that sustain ratios (Michell, 
1999). Whereas, the second premise is predicated on the work of Holder (1901), the first 
is derived from Book V of Euclid’s Elements (Heath, 1908). 
Euclid 
Building on the Aristotelian definition of quantity8, Euclid showed that a numerical 
characterisation of magnitudes was possible via the concept of identity of ratio. Defining 
a ratio of magnitudes as a form of relationship between magnitudes of the same aspect 
                                                           
8 The Aristotelian definition comprises something that, when divisible into constituent parts, contains “a 
one and a this” (Michell, 1999, p. 26). 
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with respect to size (Elements, Bk. V, Dfn. 3; in Heath, 1908, p. 113), Euclid created the 
conditions necessary to identify two ratios. That is, two ratios of magnitudes are identical 
when, and only when, they are both less than, greater than, or equal to exactly the same 
numerical ratios. Or, in modern terms, Euclid located the ratio of magnitudes relative to 
the series of rational numbers (Michell, 1999). 
Euclid’s achievement cannot be overstated, providing as it did for a conceptual basis of 
measurement. Notwithstanding, it was incomplete as a full theory of measurement and 
required extension in three ways. First, the concept of magnitude had to be defined. 
Second, the relationship between ratios and all numbers, not just rational ones, had to be 
explicated. Finally, an account of the contexts in which numbers are properly applied, 
empirically, was required. It was not until 1901, with the publication of Holder’s “The 
Axioms of Quantity and the Theory of Measurement”, that these breakthroughs occurred. 
Holder 
The critical theorem of Holder’s (1901) paper showed that if an attribute is quantitative 
then it is, in principle, measurable. Using the example of a continuous series of points on 
a straight line, and invoking ten axioms (see appendix 1), Holder proved that a relation of 
addition amongst a series of three points must implicitly exist. That is, the magnitude of 
point A may always be expressed relative to point B by a positive real number, R, where 
A=R x B and thus, the ratio of A to B is the measure of A in units of B (Michell, 1997).  
Holder’s contribution can rightly be seen as one of the great intellectual achievements 
in modern mathematics. In proving that the system of ratios of magnitudes in an 
unbounded continuous quantity is isomorphic to the system of positive real numbers, 
Holder filled an important gap in the understanding of measurement (Michell, 1999). 
That is, the possession of quantitative structure is the precise reason why some attributes 
are measurable and others not. Hence, “scientific measurement is properly defined as the 
estimation or discovery of the ratio of some magnitude of a quantitative attribute to a unit 
of the same attribute” (Michell, 1997, p.358; italics in original). 
It should be noted that there is no logical necessity for any attributes to possess a 
quantitative structure, even an ordered series of attributes. As highlighted by Michell 
(2008), Holder’s conditions of magnitude (axioms 4-10) entail the conditions of order 
(axioms 1-3) and not vice versa; see Appendix 1. Thus, the contention that any attribute, 
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including a series of ordered attributes, possesses quantitative structure is one that cannot 
be assumed outright and must be subject to validation. With that in mind, attention is now 
turned back to an analysis of Stevens’, and by default psychology’s, conception of 
measurement.  
 Critique of Traditional Psychological Measurement 
Stevens’ Sleight of Hand 
In presenting an operational rationale for representational measurement, and by 
introducing the new terminology of nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio scales, Stevens 
effectively wiped the concept of quantification from psychology. It also allowed him to 
conclude that his ratio scales were on a par with measurement sales used in the natural 
sciences (Michell, 1997). However, Stevens’ position has two critical, conceptual 
deficiencies. The first concerns the nature of quantification and the second, the veracity 
of operationism. 
Quantification 
As demonstrated by Holder’s analysis above, the practice of measurement requires 
capturing, either directly or indirectly, the additive structure of an attribute so that ratios 
between magnitudes of the attribute may be discovered or estimated. In proposing that 
measurable attributes supervene on numerical assessments, Stevens totally ignored the 
question of whether attributes are quantitative. This represents a case of accepting a 
hypothesis without adequate evidence. Without a demonstration, either logical or 
experimental, of the hypothesised additive structure of the attributes in question, no 
inference as to their quantitative nature can be drawn, nor critically, whether the 
procedures used actually measure them. Barrett (2003) summarises this point succinctly: 
“The problem is not one of ‘permissible statistics’ or that one cannot produce numerical 
results from such techniques, but, the status of any conclusions drawn remains in doubt 
while the quantitative structure of the variables so manipulated remains untested.” 
(p.427). 
Operationism 
According to Kerlinger (1979), an operational definition of a construct or variable assigns 
meaning by specifying the activities or operations necessary to measure it. Though this 
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might result in a plurality of operational definitions for a construct, Kerlinger’s advice 
was not to let such a consideration trouble a researcher because multiple definitions only 
demonstrated the flexibility and strength of psychology’s measurement regime 
(Kerlinger, 1979). Unfortunately for Kerlinger, and by extension Stevens, this advice 
presents serious metaphysical problems.  
As noted by Suppe (1977) and others (Luce, Steingrimsson, & Narens, 2010; Trendler, 
2009), whenever measurement is defined solely in terms of a measurement process, the 
inevitable result is a multiplication of theoretical terms. For instance, if intelligence is 
equated with the operations of the Stanford-Binet test, it immediately follows that the 
WAIS-R and the Ravens Progressive Matrices cannot also measure intelligence. The 
implicit conclusion, that no instruments can measure exactly the same attribute, is a 
rather implausible, indeed absurd result (Borsboom, 2005). 
Practicalism 
Broadly construed, practicalism is the view that science should serve practical ends 
(Michell, 1997). In this regard there is no doubt that modern psychometric evaluation can 
be said to serve practical purposes. Modern psychometric instruments are used in a 
diverse range of fields, and intelligence tests, to take just one example, are accurate 
predictors of academic achievement and occupational success, among other things 
(Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2005; Kline, 1998). One might conclude then that so long as an 
instrument serves a practically useful purpose, concerns about what is measured and how 
the measurement is taken can be ignored. Unfortunately, this view is mistaken. The 
discovery that an instrument A predicts behaviour B raises a scientific issue, it does not 
solve one.  
The critical issue that remains is why does A predict B? Of course it’s perfectly 
plausible to hypothesize that A predicts B because A measures construct X which in turns 
causes B. However, this is but one of many possible explanations. Until substantiated by 
empirical investigation, the claim that A measures X remains completely speculative.  
As highlighted by Barrett (2003), the proper role of the scientist is to find explanations 
for phenomena, not to create statistical indices of some immediate practical value. 
Foreshadowing these sentiments, Michell (1997) contends that practicalism, if divorced 
from robust philosophical underpinning, corrupts the investigative process: “If the 
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methods of science are not sanctioned philosophically then the claim that science is 
intellectually superior to opinion, superstition and mythology is not sustained.” (Michell, 
1997, p.356). 
Conclusion 
It is hard not to be impressed with Stevens’ response to the claims of the Ferguson 
committee that psychophysical measurement was impossible. In changing the definition 
of measurement, introducing new terminology, incorporating the dominant statistical 
tradition, and turning the critics own ideas and words against them, Stevens neutralised 
the Committee’s attack and constructed a paradigm that has lasted to this day. However, 
it is one built on soft metaphysical sand. Measurement cannot be the process of pinning 
numbers to things. 
Having unfolded the logic of quantification, as founded by the work of Aristotle, 
Euclid, and Holder, it is clear that measurement is the discovery or estimation of 
numerical relations, viz ratios, between magnitudes of a quantity, and a unit of that 
quantity. Though this might be loosely interpreted as the assignment of numerals to 
objects according to rule as Stevens espoused, Stevens’ definition is one that is 
delusional, ill founded, non rigorous, and conceptually bankrupt (Barrett, 2003; Luce, 
Steingrimsson, & Narens, 2010; Michell, 2000; Trendler, 2009). Ignoring in totality the 
logically prior task of proving the existence of quantitative structure, Stevens’ definition 
endorses measurement procedures so lax that virtually anything can be conceived as 
measurement. Attempting to justify such procedures on the grounds of practicalism 
serves only to reinforce the view of psychology as a pathological science9, deflecting 
psychologists further from the metaphysical commitments of scientific measurement. 
 Despite the problems with the dominant definition of measurement used in psychology 
today, it would be hasty to automatically conclude that the Ferguson Committee was 
correct, that fundamental measurement is, in principle, impossible in psychology. The 
methods of conjoint measurement and Rasch modelling offer alternatives to the 
traditional measurement approach. The germane question is are they any better? 
                                                           
9 Pathological science is characterised by Michell (2000) as a situation in which a hypothesis is accepted as 
true without serious attempt to test it, and without any recognition of its occurring. 
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Conjoint Measurement and Rasch Modelling 
Conjoint Measurement 
Definition Expansion 
The genesis of the theory of conjoint measurement is commonly attributed to Duncan 
Luce and John Tukey and their 1964 publication in the Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology: “Simultaneous Conjoint Measurement: A New Type of Fundamental 
Measurement” (Michell, 1999; Narens & Luce, 1986). Luce and Tukey’s key insight was 
to shift the focus away from trying to prove additive relations within attributes to trying 
to discover additive relations between sets of attributes. Building on the work of Suppes 
and Zinnes (1963), and employing insights from the mathematics of indifferences curves 
in economics, Luce and Tukey took the axioms set forth by Holder (1901) and 
generalised them to contexts with combinations of attributes (see Appendix 2). The 
subsequent mathematical refinement by Krantz (1964) showed how the traditional 
psychological definition of measurement could be expanded without sacrificing the 
classical concepts of measurement (Michell, 1999). 
Derived Measurement 
In its simplest form, a conjoint structure exists as an ordered structure that can be factored 
into two (or more) ordered substructures (Narens & Luce, 1986). If it can be 
demonstrated that some construct Z only increases with increases in X and Y, and if 
increasing Y has the same effect on Z as increasing X does, and if both X and Y are 
quantitative, then, it can be shown that Z is necessarily quantitative as well (Krantz et al., 
1971). Essentially, this is a form of derived measurement as used in physics and other 
natural sciences. In Luce and Tukey’s (1964) case, they used attributes of intensity and 
frequency to derive a quantitative measure of loudness. 
It should be noted that conjoint measurement theory has had implications for the 
natural sciences as well as psychology. Prior to the conception of conjoint measurement, 
it was unclear how derived measurement worked. Physicists, for instance, knew that the 
density of an object was the ratio of its mass to its volume, but exactly which kinds of 
observations sustained the relationship was uncertain. Conjoint measurement theory 
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changed this by illustrating how density and volume could be seen to trade off against 
each other, relative to mass (Michell, 1999). 
The Power and Problem of Conjoint Measurement 
The invention of conjoint measurement theory is one of the most important theoretical 
developments in psychology. In showing that fundamental measurement does not require 
a concatenation operation within an attribute, it provides a justification for psychological 
measurement on a par with that of physics (Borsboom, 2005). One might assume then 
that this would have ushered in a new wave of psychometric development, and 
instrument reappraisal and construction, however, this assumption would be incorrect. 
Conjoint measurement theory takes psychology only so far along the path to 
quantification. The problem with many constructs in psychology is finding conjoined 
constructs that have already been shown to possess quantitative structure, from which to 
derive measurement. Though conjoint measurement has been demonstrated with 
psychophysical attributes such as loudness and brightness (Luce, Steingrimsson, & 
Narens, 2010), and represents a significant achievement, one can readily see the difficulty 
in trying to do the same for a construct such as extraversion. 
The Unexploited Resource 
The lack of attention paid to conjoint measurement by the broader psychological 
community is so striking that it has been described as a revolution that never happened 
(Cliff, 1992). As an example, a PSYCInfo database search by the author for full text, peer 
reviewed articles with psychometrics or psychological assessment as subject items for the 
period 2000-2010 returned 20,198 articles. Adding conjoint analysis or conjoint 
measurement as a subject item to the search reduced that number to 45. However, even 
this is overstated as only 3 of those articles directly dealt with quantifying psychological 
constructs, with the rest referring to consumer research, education or healthcare concerns 
where conjoint measurement is used to infer participant preferences.  
With no research program dedicated to conjoint measurement, and few researchers 
working to develop its theory, conjoint measurement theory represents an unexploited 
psychological resource (Michell, 1999). Borsboom (2005) highlights the problem arising 
from such a lack of attention: “The logical foundation for psychological measurement has 
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thus become available, only to be neglected by its presumed audience – and psychologists 
have continued to use the term measurement for everything else.” (p.87). 
Rasch Modelling 
Scale Comparison with Expected Orders 
Rasch analysis involves the formal testing of a measurement scale against a mathematical 
measurement model originally devised by the Danish mathematician Georg Rasch 
(Rasch, 1960; Tennant & Conaghan, 2007). Specifically, the pattern of results from a set 
of items on a test is compared against a theoretical pattern of results that are purported to 
meet the fundamental axioms of measurement. In doing so, Rasch analysis relates the 
probability of a person getting an item correct to the ability of the person, and to the 
difficulty of the item, such that the probability increases with the difference between 
them in a log interval fashion (Kyngdon, 2008). In this sense, like conjoint measurement, 
Rasch modelling seeks to simultaneously measure two variables via a third (Michell, 
2008).  
For example, it can be expected that the results on a spelling test of a person with high 
spelling ability will be quite ordered. That is, the subject will likely spell words correctly 
up to the point that the words become very difficult. If the pattern of results derived from 
the spelling test is ordered in such a way that fit the Rasch measurement model, then it is 
inferred that spelling ability is necessarily quantitative. 
Problems with Rasch Modelling 
For over 30 years the idea has been advanced by psychometricians that Rasch modelling 
is conjoint measurement or a probabilistic variant thereof (Kyngdon, 2008). Indeed, some 
have called it no less than the empirical benchmark for the quantitative structure of latent 
variables (Barrett, 2003). Furthermore, in terms of practical application, Rasch modelling 
has been used successfully to improve traditional psychometric instruments and related 
outcomes (Pallant & Tennant, 2007). However, Rasch modelling is not without several 
conceptual problems, including the claim that its modelling is a form of conjoint 
measurement. 
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Latent Variables 
An initial problem concerns the nature of latent variables purportedly measured via Rasch 
modelling. As highlighted by Barrett (2005), even if the outcomes of a scale conform to 
the Rasch model, that is no guarantee it bears any relation to a substantive, meaningful 
psychological variable. This was illustrated clearly by Wood (1978) who fitted a series of 
random coin tosses to the Rasch model, demonstrating the latent variable of coin tossing 
ability. To assume that a well-fitting Rasch model implies accurate measurement 
commits the psychometric fallacy noted above, of presuming a quantitative structure 
from a merely ordinal one (Michell, 2008). 
A Quantitative Assumption 
Although Rasch modelling follows in the conceptual footsteps of conjoint measurement, 
by attempting to measure two variables by means of a relation to a third, it shares an 
assumption reminiscent of Stevens’ definition of measurement. Specifically, it is taken as 
given that test performance is a conjoint structure comprising only person ability and 
item difficulty. Luce (1987) suggested one way to test this assumption is by subjecting 
item difficulty and person ability to the axioms of Holder (1901). However, to date, no 
such investigation has been undertaken (Kyngdon, 2008).   
The Rasch Paradox 
A further troubling issue with Rasch modelling concerns the nature of error in 
measurement and is known as the Rasch Paradox (Michell, 2008). Mathematically, 
Rasch modelling is equivalent to a transformation of ordinal Guttman scaling, with the 
only difference being the addition of an error term (Kyngdon, 2008). Thus, the difference 
between a merely ordinal and a fully quantitative structure in Rasch modelling is error. In 
every other form of measurement, eliminating error improves measurement but in Rasch 
modelling if errors are eliminated, quantitative measurement is impossible. At best this 
represents a conundrum, at worst, a nonsensical outcome. 
Not Probabilistic Conjoint Measurement 
Conjoint measurement is concerned with the measurement of any attribute, where it is a 
non-interactive function of two, or more, other attributes. It thus has a generality 
exceeding that of Rasch modelling which is concerned only with the constructs of 
  What’s Still Wrong with Psychology Anyway? 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 28 
probability, item difficulty, and person difficulty. Because there is no articulation in the 
Rasch model of the ordinal and equivalence relations required by conjoint measurement, 
Rasch modelling and conjoint measurement are not mathematically equivalent. 
Therefore, it is erroneous to claim that Rasch modelling is simply a probabilistic form of 
conjoint measurement (Kyngdon, 2008; Michell, 2008).  
Conclusion 
Creating and/or modifying instruments in a way that achieves fit with the Rasch model is 
no doubt a considerable achievement and one that has yielded practical improvements 
compared with traditional psychometric instruments. However, data can fit many models 
and care should be taken in the interpretation of latent variables and assumptions 
underlying the Rasch model. Though similar to conjoint measurement, Rasch modelling 
is not a variant of conjoint measurement and, therefore, cannot be used to determine the 
quantitative structure of attributes. Hence, the conclusions drawn from Rasch modelling 
are subject to the same criticism as that of traditional methods. That is, without proof, the 
claim to truly measure variables remains speculative at best. 
In contrast, the theory of conjoint measurement should rightly be seen as an historic 
breakthrough for measurement theory in psychology. In showing that measurement does 
not depend solely on the extensive structure of attributes, it lays the foundation for a 
measurement system predicated on the same principles as those in the natural sciences. It 
is a surprising and somewhat frustrating fact, then, to find so few resources being 
employed to extend and develop conjoint measurement. Though some psychophysical 
attributes have proven amenable to conjoint measurement, thus far, psychological 
attributes have not. Some have expressed optimism that this can change with the 
development of substantive theory (e.g., Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; 
Goldstein & Wood, 1989). A recent argument challenges this contention, however, 
suggesting that regardless of improved theory, the requisite level of experimental control 
needed for measurement in psychology is not achievable (Trendler, 2009). 
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The Empirical Task in Psychological 
Measurement 
Trendler 
The Basic Assumption of Quantity 
That the possession of quantitative structure is the fundamental reason why some 
attributes are measurable, and others not, should now be clear. Verifying the existence of 
such structure can occur either directly, by satisfying the axioms of Holder (1901), or 
indirectly, by meeting the conditions prescribed by the theory of conjoint measurement 
(Luce & Tukey, 1964). Implicit in both of these approaches is the demand of the most 
basic condition of quantity, namely, that any two magnitudes of the same quantity are 
either identical or different (Michell, 1999). 
As noted by Trendler (2009), verifying this condition is an empirical task. It cannot 
simply be taken for granted that equal levels of some manifest variable, say test 
performance, correspond to equal levels of a latent variable such as intelligence. Using an 
analogy with Ohm’s law, Trendler demonstrates that the empirical task of quantification 
in psychology necessarily involves two related procedures. Firstly, manipulating a 
hypothetical construct and noting the effect of such manipulation on a dependent 
observable and secondly, meeting the requirement that no disturbances, either systematic 
or stochastic, impact on the observations.  
Control and Manipulation 
Trendler (2009) asserts that there is no doubt that psychological variables can be 
manipulated and controlled. However, he denies that variables in psychology can be 
manipulated and controlled to the extent that allows for accurate measurement to occur. 
For this reason, Trendler contends that no psychological variable has ever been measured. 
Analogous to the difficulty facing conjoint measurement, Trendler cites the interrelated 
nature of psychological constructs and the dynamic nature of the brain as insurmountable 
obstacles to empirical manipulation and control. 
Via the example of reward manipulations, Trendler (2009) points out the problem with 
trying to attribute changes in test performance solely to changes in motivation. 
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Replication with the same person across time, or by comparing different people, implies 
holding all other possible influences such as attention, learning, and ability constant. 
However, to allow for valid comparisons requires that these other variables are already 
quantified. Utilising neuroscience methodologies fares no better, according to Trendler, 
because the brain is a non localisable system. That is, there is no way to “slice and dice 
the brain of a test subject” (Trendler, 2009, p.592) in a manner that allows for 
observations of direct causation that could be attributed solely to one particular 
psychological construct. 
An Overly Strong Case? 
At face value, Trendler’s (2009) argument seems robust; however, it is not without 
criticism. One argument advanced by Markus and Borsboom (2011), concerns the 
condition of equivalence (Holder’s first axiom), on which Trendler’s argument is 
predicated. Markus and Borsboom (2011) point out that assessment of equality and 
inequality are fundamental elements of every measurement system including nominal and 
ordinal relations, and are not just particular to quantitative structures. Thus, if Trendler’s 
argument is correct, then not only is quantitative measurement ruled out but, absurdly, so 
is every form of measurement in psychology.  
A more generous reading of Trendler might presume that the assessment of 
equivalence is possible in psychology, just not for quantitative structures. However, this 
would seem to shift the burden of Trendler’s (2009) argument from Holder’s first axiom 
to other axioms which are not discussed by Trendler. The implication is that on one 
interpretation of the assessment of equivalence Trendler puts forward an overly strong 
case, but yet, on another interpretation where equivalence is possible Trendler puts 
forward no case at all (Markus & Borsboom, 2011).  
Conclusion 
Trendler’s (2009) assertion that no psychological variable has ever been measured in 
psychology is clearly false. Fundamental measurement, the same as that used in physics, 
has been applied to the constructs of loudness and brightness amongst others by using the 
theory of conjoint measurement (Luce, Steingrimsson, & Narens, 2010). Similarly, the 
absurd implications highlighted by the criticisms of Markus and Borsboom (2011) might 
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make it easy, in one sense, to dismiss Trendler’s claims out of hand. However, to do so 
entirely would be to throw out the baby with the bathwater.  
Applied to latent constructs such as introversion or motivation, that have a less clearly 
defined biological foundation than either brightness or loudness, and where proving 
Holder’s first axiom would seem exceedingly difficult, Trendler’s argument is much 
more cogent. Existing in their natural, non isolatable state, and without requisite control, 
many psychological phenomena may elude quantification. If this is the case, the 
implications for psychology are quite serious. Notwithstanding the arguments presented 
on p.39, Kline (1998) notes that without quantitative data the philosophical justification 
for psychological methods such as structural equation modelling and factor and 
regression analysis is missing: “It may be that the task of the new psychometrics is 
impossible…If this is the case, then the truth must be faced that perhaps psychology can 
never be a science.” (cited in Borsboom, 2005, p.85).   
Conclusion 
Technical versus Conceptual Progress 
Since Fechner’s earliest attempts to subordinate the mental and physical realms to 
mathematical determination via the evaluation of just noticeable differences, there can be 
no question that psychological measurement has increased by orders of sophistication. 
Statistical methodologies such as structural equation modelling, factor analysis, and 
meta-analysis are three prominent examples. In other ways, however, it is clear that there 
has been little progress. Though the advent of neurological imaging is often touted as a 
shining example of increasing technological and measurement sophistication, question 
marks hang over many of the correlations obtained between brain activity and personality 
measures (Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009). Similarly, the issue of whether 
psychological variables are quantitative remains a question that for the most part remains 
unexplored and unanswered. 
 The question of quantification in psychology was one that was initially overridden on 
practical grounds by followers of Fechner and subsequently transmuted into a statistical 
concern by Thorndike and Kelley. Then when confronted with criticisms of the Ferguson 
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Committee, Stevens created a new measurement paradigm. Operationalising the concept 
of measurement and welding the four scales of measurement to statistical methods of 
Fisher and Neyman and Pearson, ensured the widespread adoption of Stevens’ definition 
and effectively buried the issue of quantification. This is an unparalleled example of a 
theory being accepted because it answered questions, rather than investigated because it 
raised them (Michell, 1999). 
The Problems and Consequences of Traditional Measurement 
The truth is that operationalising the definition of measurement resulted in a definition so 
loose as to be farcical. Paradoxically, it leads to a situation where almost anything can be 
called measurement but where no two measures can measure the same thing. No doubt 
there are examples where the traditional approach to psychological measurement has 
been shown to be practically useful in illuminating relationships between variables. 
However, by assuming, and ignoring, the issue of the quantitative status of the relations, 
such cases remain exercises of uncertain scientific validity. They raise questions about 
psychological phenomena but do not answer them. 
The consequences of adherence to the dominant psychological measurement model has 
led some to conclude that psychology comprises only trivial exemplars of mostly 
inaccurate explanations of phenomena; that psychology produces transient descriptions of 
never-to-be-reencountered situations, that are easily contradicted with replication 
(Barrett, 2008; Wright, 1997). Some of those sharing similar sentiments have turned to 
Rasch modelling to improve traditional instruments. Though there has been some 
success, Rasch modelling is not without problems, paradoxically predicating 
measurement on error, and failing to prove axiomatically its claim of fundamental 
measurement. 
A Quantitative Science? 
The most significant development in psychological measurement has been the 
introduction of the theory of conjoint measurement. In providing an indirect means of 
proving quantitative structure, and taking advantage of the interrelated nature of 
psychological phenomena, the theory of conjoint measurement has shown how 
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fundamental measurement, equal to that in the natural sciences, is possible. 
Unfortunately, it has also been a most ignored development. The greatest obstacle 
concerns the lack of already quantified constructs from which to derive the quantitative 
structure of additional, related constructs.  
Although such an approach is made possible by the interrelated nature of psychological 
phenomena, it does have a drawback, that is, obtaining the requisite levels of isolation 
and control necessary for accurate measurement. This is a condition that some believe 
cannot be attained and which has led others to question whether psychology can be seen 
as a science at all (Kline, 1998; Schonemann, 1994; Trendler, 2009). 
Such a conclusion is unwarranted. There is no necessity for variables in psychology to 
possess quantitative structure. Similarly, there is no necessity for psychology to concern 
itself solely with quantitative structures. Non quantitative, or qualitative variables, can be 
studied in terms of classes and categories and psychology will be no worse for it. It will 
remain a science. 
Future Options 
At this juncture, there are three possible ways for psychological measurement to proceed. 
First, psychologists can continue using the dominant measurement tradition instantiated 
by Stevens. There may be some practical benefit in being able to loosely predict 
behaviour via the identification of correlated variables. At best, however, it is the option 
of an epistemological ostrich, burying the problems of quantification in the sands of 
practicalism.  
 Second, the application of the theory of conjoint measurement in order to further the 
discovery of psychological phenomena can be pursued. Philosophically, this is a far 
stronger alternative. However, there is no guarantee to how many further constructs can 
be shown to possess additive structure using this method and, as noted by Kyngdon 
(2008), it also requires the kind of substantive theorising that psychologists studiously 
avoid.  
Third, new and alternative methods for studying psychological phenomena, which do 
not rely on assumptions of quantitative structure, can be utilised. Probabilities of 
occurrence, order relations, and structural analysis are germane methods that can be used 
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to identify and evaluate psychological phenomena. Indeed, the new method of 
Observation Oriented Modelling documented in chapter 5 employs all three of these 
characteristics to appraise psychological theory.  
Conclusion 
There can be no doubt that some psychological attributes are quantitative. Continuing to 
assume that all are, by utilising only linear statistical methodologies to measure 
psychological variables, is at best bad science and at worst, fraudulent. It is with rare 
exceptions that psychological phenomena have been shown to possess quantitative 
structure. Without a true revolution stemming from interest in the theory of conjoint 
measurement, or the resolution of the problems highlighted by Trendler (2009), 
psychology many variables in psychology will remain un-quantified. Option three, 
therefore, represents psychology’s most viable class of method for tackling issues raised 
by the measurement problem.
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Chapter 3: Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
History 
Early History 
The fundamental logical elements of what is today referred to as null hypothesis 
significance testing (NHST) were present in scientific papers as early as the 1700s (Kline, 
2004). For example, in 1714 Daniel Bernoulli, one of the founding fathers of probability 
theory, conducted tests of significance on the randomness of planetary orbits. Similarly, 
in 1773 Laplace tested the hypothesis that comets come from outside the solar system 
(Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). A systematic method did not emerge, however, until Karl 
Pearson developed the first modern test of significance, the Chi Square, in 1900 
(Hubbard & Lindsay, 2008). 
Although Pearson may have been the founding father, it is Sir Ronald Fisher who is 
credited for producing the scaffolding on which psychological statistics was founded, and 
to whom responsibility can be laid for popularising significance testing (Wright, 2009; 
Zilliak & McCloskey, 2008). The many editions of his books, Statistical Methods for 
Research Workers (1925) and The Design of Experiments (1935), have proved to be two 
of the most influential texts in psychology (Gigerenzer, 2000; Hubbard & Lindsay, 2008; 
Yates & Mather, 1963). Though today it is quite rare to see Fisher’s name associated 
specifically with the NHST method now taught in psychology, it is even rarer to see the 
name of William Sealy Gosset mentioned, or credited, with the development of NHST 
(Gigerenzer, 2004, Hubbard & Bayarri, 2003).  
Gosset 
Beer and Mathematics 
Born in Canterbury, UK, in 1876, Gosset studied at Winchester College and New College, 
Oxford where he graduated with a first class in mathematical moderations in 1897 and 
chemistry in 1899. A staunch pragmatist, Gosset was focused on the practical 
applications of mathematics to issues of substantive and economic significance (Ziliak & 
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McCloskey, 2008). Thus, it was while working at the Guinness Brewery in Dublin that 
Gosset saw the need for a small sample test to distinguish the quality of varieties of hops 
and barley. Gosset’s subsequent investigations resulted in the publication of two 
revolutionary papers. 
The t-Test 
Using a mechanical, turn crank calculator, Gosset created the tables and formulae for 
what is now known as the z test, which he published as “The Probable Error of a Mean” 
and “The Probable Error of a Correlation Coefficient” in 1908. Though the forerunner of 
the t-Test, the ideas in the papers also laid the foundation for the creation of Monte Carlo 
simulation, the concepts of power, and what came to be called “the alternative 
hypothesis” (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). The t-Test itself didn’t appear formally until 
1922 when Fisher substituted n-1 for n as the sample size in Gosset's calculations, and 
Gosset’s original tables were corrected and renamed as the Student’s t-Test of 
significance (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). The name was a reference to the pseudonym, 
Student, necessarily used by Gosset on his earlier papers, as a condition of his 
employment with Guinness Brewery. 
Copyright Cover-up 
Though Gosset copyrighted his original tables in 1908, 1914, and 1917, Fisher 
copyrighted the t-Tables in his own name in 1925 when he published Statistical Methods 
for Research Workers. As noted by Ziliak and McCloskey (2004), though Gosset was 
mentioned, each successive edition gave less credit to Gosset for his contribution. Indeed, 
Fisher’s later book The Design of Experiments makes no mention of Gosset at all even 
though the same tables appear. These omissions no doubt helps explain the rarity with 
which Gosset’s name is recognised by researchers today. 
Fisher 
Agronomy and the Direct Probability 
The value of Gosset’s calculations to Fisher become readily apparent when one considers 
Fisher’s position on the nature of methodology and scientific investigation. Believing 
inductive inference was the only way new knowledge was ever accumulated in science 
(Fisher, 1966), Fisher initially dabbled with Bayesianism (Zabell, 1992). However, 
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thinking the lack of a priori distributional information unacceptably subjective, Fisher 
quickly came to reject Bayes’ rule as a sound method of scientific enquiry (Gigerenzer, 
2000; Hubbard, 2004). Seeking a more objective methodology of inductive inference, 
Fisher renounced the inverse probability of Bayesianism, the probability of a hypothesis 
(H) given the data (D), Pr(H|D), and instead focused on the direct probability, Pr(D|H). 
Fisher’s view of inductive inference was strongly influenced by the practical problems 
of agronomists, who were concerned with the interpretation of agricultural field experiments 
on crops, and with whom Fisher had direct contact while statistician at Rothamsted 
experimental Station under Sir John Russell (Yates & Mather, 1963). Fisher recognised 
early on that the analysis of variance provided a powerful technique for explaining the 
individual differences in crop yields due to different fertilisation regimes, and it was from 
such work that Fisher’s exhortation of the estimation of population parameters from small 
samples was born (Rodgers, 2010; Yates & Mather, 1963). The introductory chapter of The 
Design of Experiments best exemplifies Fisher’s thinking in this regard: “We may at once 
admit that any inference from the particular to the general must be attended with some degree 
of uncertainty, but this is not the same as to admit that such inference cannot be absolutely 
rigorous, for the nature and degree of the uncertainty may itself be capable of rigorous 
expression” (Fisher, 1966, p.3-4). 
The Rare Event 
In a general sense, Fisher’s rationale was falsificationist, believing that no scientific 
theory could ever be proved with surety (Gigerenzer, 2000). As such, Fisher thought the 
best scientific investigators could hope for was a whittling away and rejection of 
plausible competing theories. Thus, Fisher advocated determining the probability of a 
result, in addition to more extreme ones, assuming a null hypothesis of no or limited 
effect or relationship. Any rare and unexpected observations then, constituted better 
inductive evidence against the null hypothesis. Or as Fisher succinctly stated: “Either an 
exceptionally rare event has occurred or the theory is not true” (Fisher, 1959, p.9). 
Additional Considerations 
Fisher’s model of significance testing required researchers to know in advance the 
possible outcomes of an experiment and to randomise all variables so as to allow valid 
interpretation of results (Fisher, 1966). Fisher also prescribed that only the null 
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hypothesis was to be tested, with any alternative hypothesis or theory being too inexact to 
allow proper inference (Fisher, 1966). Similarly, Fisher exhorted experimenters to pay 
heed to sensitivity, the ability to discriminate between significant and non-significant 
findings, via the size of the experiment (Fisher, 1966).  
Initially, Fisher also advocated the use of a 5% threshold as a convention by which to 
judge the significance of an experimental outcome. However, Fisher later recanted stating 
instead that experimenters should report the actual level of significance obtained 
(Gigerenzer, 2000). In addition, the publication of both significant and non-significant 
findings was encouraged so that cumulative frequencies of phenomena could be 
established (Fisher, 1966). Such relative frequencies were important to Fisher for he only 
considered a phenomenon established when experiments could be conducted that rarely 
failed to yield statistically significant results: “…it should be noted that the null 
hypothesis is never proved or established, but is possibly disproved, in the course of 
experimentation. Every experiment may be said to exist only in order to give the facts a 
chance of disproving the null hypothesis.” (Fisher, 1966, p. 16). 
Summary 
Under Fisherian logic, a significance test is a tool of inductive inference. It is used solely 
to evaluate the probability of having obtained evidence against the null hypothesis, 
assuming the null hypothesis to be true. The null hypothesis need not be one of zero 
difference with the exact significance level to be reported, and lacking specified 
alternative hypotheses, attention to issues of experiment sensitivity are to be accorded 
keen interest. Finally, Fisher’s hypothesis testing was to be used in cases where little was 
known about the problem at hand, with other tools of inference available as investigations 
progressed (Gigerenzer, 2000). 
As noted by Gigerenzer (2000), Fisher sometimes changed and reversed his logic of 
inference at different periods. Thus, Fisher’s writings possess an elusive quality and 
many have questioned Fisher’s exact meaning and interpretation of key concepts. Gosset 
for example, eschewed the lack of consideration given by Fisher to the “pecuniary 
advantage” of experimentation (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). However, it was Egon 
Pearson and Jerzy Neyman who would famously become the staunchest critics, and 
favourite target of, Fisher’s philosophy. 
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Neyman and Pearson 
The Alternative Hypothesis 
The Neyman-Pearson statistical paradigm (1928a, 1928b, 1933) is now considered to be 
the norm in classical statistical circles and it grew out of dissatisfaction with several 
elements of the Fisherian approach to hypothesis testing (Hubbard, 2004; Nickerson, 
2000). The main difference between the two approaches, and the one that caused the most 
contention over the years, concerned the role of an alternative hypothesis. Whereas Fisher 
thought testing the null hypothesis alone was sufficient, Neyman and Pearson, in 
accordance with Gosset (Hubbard, 2004), believed the formulation of an alternative 
hypothesis to be required: “…in addition to H0 [the null hypothesis] there must exist 
some other hypotheses, one of which may conceivably be true…This is quite important. 
The fact is that, unless the alternative Ha is specified, the problem of an optimal test of 
H0 is indeterminate.” (Neyman, 1977, p.104). 
New Concepts 
Rejecting Fisher’s ideas about hypothetical infinite populations, Neyman and Pearson 
also believed results should be predicated on the assumption of repeated random 
sampling from a defined population (Hubbard, 2004). When coupled with the 
requirement for an alternative hypothesis, the concepts of false rejection (Type І error) 
and false acceptance (Type Π error) of the null hypothesis were born. Complementing 
these concepts was the idea of the power of a statistical test, the probability of rejecting a 
false null hypothesis (1-Beta). Though similar to Fisher’s concept of sensitivity, the 
Neyman-Pearson concept of power was more complex, looking at more than just sample 
size, and was invoked prior to, not after, an experiment had been completed (Hubbard & 
Bayarri, 2003). Consequently, the Neyman-Pearson approach sees hypothesis tests as 
rules of inductive behaviour, concerned with decisions between alternative courses of 
action such that, in the long run, error is minimised (Neyman & Pearson, 1933). 
Philosophical Differences 
The philosophies underlying both the Neyman-Pearson and Fisherian approaches to 
hypothesis testing can be seen to be quite different, then. Whereas Fisher gave an 
epistemic interpretation to a significance test, believing significance indicated truth or 
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falsity of a particular hypothesis, Neyman and Pearson provided a behaviouristic 
rationale, with a significance test simply providing a rule for decision making regardless 
of the researcher’s degree of belief (Gigerenzer, 2000). This was a point on which 
Neyman and Pearson (1933) were quite explicit: “We are inclined to think that as far as a 
particular hypothesis is concerned, no test based upon the theory of probability can by 
itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of that hypothesis" (p. 290-
291). 
Summary 
Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing represents a markedly different approach to 
statistical inference from that of Fisher. Philosophically, the focus is on inductive 
behaviour rather than inductive inference. Conceptually, the method includes the addition 
of an alternative hypothesis, the assumption of repeated sampling from a known 
distribution, and the concepts of error and power. Indeed, the differences are so stark one 
might question how the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson approaches could both be 
legitimately applied to the same problems.  
The Inference Revolution 
Changing Research Practices 
The inference revolution is a term coined by Gigerenzer and Murray (1987) to describe 
the dramatic shift in research practices that occurred in psychology between 1940 and 
1955. Prior to 1940, the dominant tradition had been a Wundtian one, with 
experimentation of single participants the norm. Beginning in 1940s America, however, 
this began to change to treatment group experiments in which group means were 
compared and led to the institutionalisation of one type of inferential statistics as the 
method of scientific inference guiding university curricula and journal editorial policy 
(Gigerenzer, 2000; Halpin & Stam, 2006). The swiftness of the statistical subjugation 
was best expressed by Kendall (1942) who dryly remarked that statisticians had “overrun 
every branch of science with a rapidity of conquest rivalled only by Attila, Mohammed, 
and the Colorado beetle” (p. 69). 
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Practical Pressures 
Danziger (1990) saw the inference revolution as a result of pressure on American 
psychologists to legitimise their work by showing practical utility. At the time, the largest 
markets for psychological products were for educational and military application. 
Consequently, single-participant experiments were seen to be of little value. In contrast, 
the treatment-group experiment allowed users an efficient way to measure and compare 
groups of individuals in different treatment conditions (Gigerenzer, 2000; Gould, 1981). 
For such tasks, the null hypothesis testing of group means seemed tailor made. 
The results were dramatic. For example, the percentage of empirical studies reporting 
only group data published in the American Journal of Psychology rose from 25% to 80% 
between 1915 and 1950 (Gigerenzer, 2000). Conversely, over the same time period, 
published individual-only articles plummeted from 70% to 17% (Gigerenzer, 2000). The 
figures for the acceptance of null hypothesis testing were even more dramatic, with Rucci 
and Tweney (1980) reporting only 17 articles using NHST procedures between 1934 and 
1940. However, by 1955, more than 80% of the articles surveyed employed some form of 
significance testing. It should be noted that the changes were not isolated only to journal 
articles, with half of the psychology departments in the leading American universities 
offering courses on Fisherian methods, and making inferential statistics a graduate 
program requirement by the early 1950s (Gigerenzer, 1991). 
Hybridisation and the Modern Method 
It is an interesting, and recurring, theme that practical motivations drove the spread of 
null hypothesis testing and treatment group approaches from the field to the laboratory, 
and not the other way around (Gigerenzer, 2000). Faced with the two contrasting 
ideological approaches of Neyman-Pearson and Fisher, and coupled with the huge 
demand for practical application, academic authors started to graft the Neyman-Pearson 
concepts onto the skeleton of Fisherian logic (Gigerenzer, 2000; Halpin & Stam, 2006). 
Guildford’s Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education, first published in 1942, 
is a germane example combining Fisher’s experimental logic with the accept/reject 
dichotomy of Neyman and Pearson (Gigerenzer, 2000). The end result is that 50 years 
later a hybridised statistical methodology had become enshrined as the method for 
statistical inference in psychology (Kline, 2004).  
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Hubbard, (2004) has remarked that today null hypothesis significance testing follows 
Neyman and Pearson formally but Fisher philosophically. The modern hybrid logic, for 
example, employs a null hypothesis that is set up to be disproved, in accordance with 
Fisher, however, it is a hypothesis of strictly no difference, with rejection allowing 
acceptance of an alternative hypothesis in keeping with Neyman-Pearson thinking 
(Gigerenzer, 2004; Hubbard & Bayarri, 2003). Similarly, notions of power and error are 
borrowed from the Neyman-Pearson tradition but the Type І error probability is often 
referred to as the significance level, as in Fisherian logic (Hubbard, 2004). Finally, results 
obtained are interpreted epistemically and not behaviourally, a further nod to Fisher’s 
paradigm (Gigerenzer, 2000). 
Summary 
As noted by Hubbard and Bayarri (2003), the conjoining of Neyman-Pearson hypothesis 
testing with Fisher’s significance testing is a marriage of convenience that neither camp 
would have condoned. It is also one that many others have questioned, with Schmidt and 
Hunter (1997) and Schmidt (1996) calling for the modern NHST method to be banned 
from use in psychology. Rozeboom (1997) called it “the most bone-headedly misguided 
procedure ever institutionalised in the rote training of science students.” (p. 335). 
Foreshadowing Rozeboom’s comments, Paul Meehl (1978) believed it one of the worst 
things to ever happen in psychology and like several others, most notably Skinner, Meehl 
saw Fisher as the root cause: “Sir Ronald has befuddled us, mesmerised us, and led us 
down the primrose path.” (p. 817). 
Such condemnation is perhaps unwarranted. As illustrated above and highlighted by 
Gigerenzer (2000), Fisher saw significance testing as but one weak option amongst many 
for statistical inference and his original method bears little resemblance to the ritualised 
process used in modern psychology. There is, however, no shortage of other views on 
NHST with more than 400 references devoted to the topic (Kline, 2004). Indeed, the 
number of published journal articles criticising NHST practices has grown from less than 
30 in the 1970s to more than 180 during the 1990s (Kline, 2004). It is to such criticism 
that attention is now turned. 
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Criticisms of Null Hypothesis Significance 
Testing 
Assumptions 
Modern Null Hypothesis Significance testing is predicated on several assumptions which, 
if violated, can lead to inaccurate calculations and erroneous inference. The most 
common of these assumptions mandate that samples are randomly selected, the threshold 
for significance is 5%, the dependent variable is a linear combination of the effects of 
independent manipulation, that observations and error are independent and come from 
normally distributed populations, and that these distributions are equal across conditions 
(Kline, 2004; Loftus, 1996). As noted by Kline (2004), these assumptions underlying 
NHST are much more restrictive than many researchers realise.  
Sampling 
The p values for test statistics used in NHST require random sampling from known 
populations and are crucial to making valid population inferences. However, most 
samples in social science are not randomly selected, being instead convenience samples 
from homogenised cohorts such as university students with generally little, or no, attempt 
made to specify the population of which the sample is supposedly indicative (Kline, 
2004). The result is that p-values are understated, with statistical significance overstated 
because standard errors are too conservative (Reichardt & Gollob, 1999). The problem 
with such an approach is elucidated by Lisa Feldman Barrett: “The goal of psychology is 
to make nomothetic laws – laws that apply to all people… the question is how can you do 
that when you’re sampling by convenience” (cited in Grice, 2011, p.92). 
Normality 
Assumptions of normality are also critical to NHST, with violations affecting both p 
values and power calculations regardless of whether group sizes are equal or not (Erceg-
Hurn & Mirosevich, 2008; Kline, 2004). Micceri (1989) examined 440 large data sets 
from the psychological and educational literatures which encompassed a wide range of 
ability and aptitude measures (e.g., math and reading tests) and psychometric measures 
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(e.g., scales measuring personality, anxiety, anger, satisfaction, locus of control). None of 
the data were found to be normally distributed, and few distributions even remotely 
resembled the normal curve. Instead, the distributions were frequently multimodal, 
skewed, and heavy-tailed. Micceri’s (1989) findings also cohere with other research that 
has identified similar asymmetrical and skewed distributions for commonly employed 
psychological variables such as reaction time (Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich, 2008). 
Whereas it was once thought that NHST was relatively insensitive to such violations, 
Wilcox (1998) has shown how even relatively small departures from normal distributions 
can lead to positive bias, incorrect calculations, and distorted inferences. Though there 
are versions of several tests, such as the t-Test and F-test that do not assume normality or 
homogeneity of variance, they are rarely used in practice with similar under utilisation 
evident for other modern statistical techniques such as bootstrapping and Winsorization 
(Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich, 2008; Kline, 2004). 
Homoscedasticity 
Another important assumption underlying classic parametric tests is that of equal 
population variances which can be measured in terms of a variance ratio (VR). If two 
populations have similar variances, the VR will be close to 1:1. For example, if the 
variance of population A is 12 and the variance of population B is 10, the VR would be 
12:10, or 1.2:1. However, when real data are analysed, the VR often strays markedly 
from the 1:1 ratio required to fulfil the assumption (Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich, 2008).  
Keselman et al. (1998) conducted a VR review of ANOVA analyses in 17 educational 
and child psychology journals. In studies using a one-way design, the mean VR was 
found to be 4:1 and in factorial studies, the mean VR was even higher at 7.84:1 
(Keselman et al., 1998). Similar results have been evidenced in the Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General and the 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance (Erceg-Hurn 
& Mirosevich, 2008).  
Linear Effects 
Assuming that the dependent variable is obtained by adding up effects from a 
combination of independent variable(s), interactions, and error is also problematic in 
NHST. Loftus (1996) contends that methods of data analysis often dictate the nature of 
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psychological theory. Assuming a general linear model, therefore, can bias research 
against more realistic or interesting hypotheses leading to a one-size-fits-all philosophy. 
Or as Loftus (1996) keenly states: “Off the shelf assumptions produce off the shelf 
conclusions.” (p.164).  
Dichotomous Thinking and Practical Significance 
The outcome of a statistical test is dichotomous. Depending on the significance threshold, 
typically 5%, either the null hypothesis is rejected or the alternate hypothesis is rejected. 
Many authors have highlighted the problem with such an evaluation (Chow, 1996; 
Cohen, 1994; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989), noting that two similar experiments can have 
differing levels of significance and yet produce the same effect size10. Statistical 
significance, therefore, does not necessarily translate to practical significance. However, 
as Kline (2004) reports, experimenter confidence in research outcomes is strongly linked 
to levels of significance with sharp declines in confidence associated with values just 
above .05 compared with values just below .05. 
Verification 
One further problem with the assumptions underpinning NHST is that they are seldom 
verified or applied appropriately in practice. For instance, Keselman et al. (1998) 
reviewed more than 400 analyses published in psychology journals during 1994 and 1995 
and found few studies validated the assumptions of the statistical tests employed. 
Similarly, Max and Onghena (1999) found corresponding levels of neglect in speech, 
language, and hearing research journals, whereas Glover and Dixon (2004) found only 
35% of the tests employed in a range of psychology journals were utilised in a manner 
consistent with the logic of NHST. These examples lend credence to Kline’s (2004) 
contention of a substantial gap between NHST as described in the literature, and its use in 
practice. The dire implication is that there are likely to be few cases in reality where 
NHST gives completely accurate results (Kline, 2004). 
                                                           
10 Effect size is a general term that refers to a suite of statistical formula that calculates the strength of 
association between variables. Cohen’s d and Pearson’s r are but two indicators of effect size. (Cozby, 
2004). 
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Meehl’s Conjecture 
It might be contended that the gaps identified by Kline (2004) represent problems with 
researcher application and not any deficiency intrinsic to the NHST method itself. There 
are, however, two other related assumptions that do highlight a serious inadequacy with 
the NHST method. Taken together they make up what has been come to be known as 
Meehl’s conjecture.  
Nulls of No Difference 
By assuming a weak, zero difference, range null hypothesis, as opposed to a stronger, 
numerical point prediction, the psychological use of NHST is diametrically dissimilar to 
that in physics (Meehl, 1967). The problem with such an assumption is that it sets the 
hurdle too low for a test to surmount. In order for two groups, which differ on some 
independent property, to record identical dependent variable outcomes, either all average 
values of determinants of the output variables must be the same in both groups, or the 
pattern of differences of the average values must precisely counterbalance (Meehl, 1967). 
This is extremely unlikely, with almost any psychological variable differing between 
groups to some decimal place. The resulting inference is that psychologists are 
calculating hypothesis on premises they do not believe (Rorer, 1991). 
Independence and Sample Size 
As noted by Hubbard and Lindsay (2008), sample size has a huge effect on significance 
level by, amongst other things, increasing the power of a test. When coupled with 
Meehl’s (1997) assertion that everything in psychology correlates to some extent with 
everything else, and with the unlikely assumption of a null of no difference, a crud factor 
emerges in psychological research (Meehl, 1997). The grave consequence of the crud 
factor is that the null hypothesis is almost always false.  
Empirical Backing 
Meehl’s conjecture, which in the case of directional hypothesis predicts null rejection 
levels of 50%, has been demonstrated empirically. Using random, computer generated, 
directional, hypotheses and data from 81,000 individual MMPI-2 tests, Waller (2004) 
tested items for hypothetical gender differences. As noted by Gigerenzer (2004), of 511 
items, 46% were found to be statistically significant with many item means 50-100 times 
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larger than their standard errors. These findings also cohere with Bakan’s (1966) work in 
which more than 60,000 test results were compared on such arbitrary criteria as east 
versus west of the Mississippi river and all tests were found to be significant. However, it 
was Berkson (1938) who first highlighted the problem: “If, then, we know in advance the 
p that will result from an application of a chi-square test to a large sample, there would 
seem to be no use in doing it on a smaller one. But since the result of the former test is 
known, it is no test at all.” (p. 526). 
Logic 
p(D|H0) ≠ p(H0|D) 
It has been remarked by many authors that NHST procedures fail to tell researchers what 
they want to know (Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2004; Kline, 2004; Nickerson, 2000; 
Rorer, 1991). When testing H0 one obtains the probability that the data (D) could have 
arisen if H0 were true, p(D|H0). However, the inverse probability, p(H0|D), the 
probability of the hypothesis given the data, is what most researchers are seeking to 
quantify. This probability is not the same; a significance test does not provide a 
probability for a hypothesis. 
To understand why, consider the form of the following syllogism which embodies the 
logic of NHST:  
P1: If the null hypothesis is correct, the observed data would likely have not occurred.  
P2: The observed data has, however, occurred.  
C1: Therefore, the null hypothesis is probably not true.  
Though this sounds logical it is actually formally invalid being equivalent to the 
syllogism: If a person is a New Zealander, he is probably not a member of parliament. 
This person is a member of parliament; therefore, he is probably not a New Zealander.  
Lindley’s Paradox 
Another issue consonant with sample size was elucidated by Lindley in 1957. Lindley 
showed that for any level of significance, p, and for any non-zero prior probability of the 
null hypothesis, Pr(H0), a sample size could be found such that the posterior probability 
of the null, Pr(H0|D), is 1 − p. That is, a null hypothesis rejected at the .05 level by a 
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Fisherian significance test could nevertheless have 95% support from a Bayesian 
viewpoint!  
The rationale stems from the fact that no matter how small the p value, the likelihood 
ratio Pr(D|H0) / Pr(D|HA) approaches infinity as the sample size increases. 
Consequently, for large n, a small p value can actually be interpreted as evidence in 
favour of H0 rather than against it (Hubbard & Lindsey, 2008). This also no doubt 
explains Royall’s (1986) example of well-known statisticians whose interpretations of p 
values in small versus large sample studies were totally contradictory. Though some 
argued that a given p value in a small sample study is stronger evidence against H0 than 
the same p value in a large sample study, others argued precisely the opposite. 
Another Bayesian Argument 
A related implication of the above logic is an argument advanced by Bayesian 
statisticians. By convention, the null hypothesis is rejected when p(observed data | null 
hypothesis) <.05. However, doing so implies the conclusion that p(null hypothesis | 
observed data) is small. Indeed, using a Bayesian significance test for a normal mean, 
Berger and Sellke (1987) showed that for p values of .05, .01, and .001, the inverse 
probabilities of the null, p(H0|D), for n = 50 are .52, .22, and .034. For n = 100, the 
corresponding figures are .60, .27, and .045. Berger and Sellke (1987) went further, 
demonstrating that data yielding a p value of .05 resulted in a posterior probability of the 
null hypothesis of at least .30 for any objective prior distribution11.  
It might be argued by dyed-in-the-wool Neyman-Pearson frequentists that such an 
argument does not apply in long-run repeated sampling situations where α is a 
prescription for behaviours, rather than a means of assessing evidence like the p value in 
Fisherian and modern NHST logic. Sellke, Bayarri, and Berger (2001), however, devised 
a method for calibrating p values so that they can be interpreted as Neyman–Pearson 
frequentist error probabilities. They found that, p =.05 translates into a frequentist error 
probability of α (.05) = .289 in rejecting H0, a result suggesting no evidence against H0. 
Even α (.01) = .111. This, coupled with the Berger and Selke (1987) findings, undermines 
                                                           
11 A test of a normal mean with symmetric priors with equal prior weight given to H0 and HA 
  What’s Still Wrong with Psychology Anyway? 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 49 
significance testing as a method of generating reasonable measures of evidence (Hubbard 
& Lindsay, 2008). 
Sequence Effects  
A further logical impediment with the modern NHST method concerns the sequence by 
which results are obtained. Consider Fisher’s (1925) famous tea tasting experiment in 
which a lady is asked to distinguish whether milk has been added to a cup of tea prior to, 
or after, the tea was added. With a null of no difference, that the participant cannot 
discriminate accurately, the expectation would be for 50% correct and 50% incorrect 
guesses. Presuming the participant actually guessed correctly on the first 5 of 6 trials 
(CCCCCI), a p value of .109 results, which is not significant at the 5% level (Hubbard & 
Lindsay, 2008). Now, imagine that a researcher decides to run the experiment until the 
participant makes a mistake, rather than having 6 specified trials. In this case, assuming 
the same sequence of outcomes as in the first experiment, the p value is .031, which is 
significant at the 5% threshold (Hubbard & Lindsay, 2008).  
The difference arises due to the nature of how extreme results are calculated in each 
scenario. In the first fixed-trial experiment there are 7 different ways the participant could 
have correctly identified at least 5 of 6 cups (CCCCCI, CCCCIC, CCCICC, CCICCC, 
CICCCC, ICCCCC, and CCCCCC), thus giving a probability of 7(1/2)6 = .109.  
By contrast, in the second sequential case a potentially infinite number of extreme 
cases could have occurred where the first 5 cups were correctly identified, i.e., 6 correct, 
7 correct, 8 correct etc. The maths in this case gives a result of (1/2)6 + (1/2)7 + (1/2)8 + 
… = (1/2)6 / (1- 1/2) = (1/2)5 = .031. As noted by Hubbard and Lindsay (2008), this is 
nonsensical as the exact same data, obtained in the exact same sequence, should give the 
same p values. However, depending on the vagaries of researcher preference in 
experimental design, different results ensue. 
Extreme Values 
A similar, related problem is illustrated by Rorer (1991). In psychological statistics texts, 
it is common to draw NHST distributions as two competing point estimates, as in the first 
graph in Figure 1. However, with a null hypothesis of no difference, the alternative 
hypothesis becomes a directional one stating that every value greater than zero has the 
  What’s Still Wrong with Psychology Anyway? 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 50 
same probability of occurring. Thus, as demonstrated in the second graph in Figure 1, it is 
possible to have a value in the rejection region for H0, even though the probability of 
such an outcome is greater under H0 than HA.  
 
Figure 1: Null Hypothesis versus a point hypothesis compared to a null hypothesis versus a directional hypothesis. Reprinted with 
permission from Rorer, 1991, p.73. 
 
The problem is most eruditely expressed by Jeffreys (1939): “What the use of p implies 
… is that a hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted 
observable results that have not occurred. This seems a remarkable procedure.” (p. 316).  
Sampling Uncertainty 
Given the issues associated with the underlying assumptions of NHST, Meehl’s 
conjecture, and the logical arguments presented above, it might be wondered whether the 
modern, hybridised NHST method has any use and/or support at all. A view 
characteristic of NHST supporters is advanced by Mulaik, Raju, and Harshman (1997) 
who assert that the sole task of NHST is to provide a measure of sampling uncertainty: 
“That’s all a significance test provides, no more, no less.” (p.73). However, there are 
strong reasons to question such a view in psychology. 
Application 
Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing is a perfectly valid and well suited technique for 
making inferences and guiding decision making in domains such as quality control. In 
such situations, the acceptable deviation from null can be specified; both accept and 
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reject decisions are appropriate categories; the alternative courses of action can be clearly 
delineated; and any decision can be regarded as one of a series of such choices, such that 
one can minimize the overall loss (Bakan, 1966). However, as noted by many authors, 
such requirements often go unfulfilled in psychological research making accurate and 
valid inferences a rare and hazardous undertaking (Bakan, 1966; Cumming, 2008; Haig, 
2011). 
Power 
A further challenge is issued by Schmidt and Hunter (1997) who, following Cohen 
(1962), cite the low average power of significance tests in psychology as problematic. 
Historically, the psychology literature has employed power in primary studies of between 
.4 and .6 (Cohen, 1962; Kline, 2004; Schmidt, 1996; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1992). 
With such numbers, even if a legitimate effect did exist, it would only be detected by 
researchers about half of the time. As Schmidt and Hunter (1997) remark, one might be 
better off flipping an unbiased coin to determine research results.  
It has, however, been argued that such a conclusion is overstated (Mulaik, Raju, & 
Harshman, 1997). Power is after all a function of several factors12 and thus, a study with 
a power level of .5 for detecting medium effects might have the power level of .8 for 
detecting large effects. Unfortunately, this argument is blunted when one considers that in 
many research domains in psychology the power is less than .5, and that typical effect 
sizes for psychological variables are of a small to medium magnitude (Cafri, Kromrey, & 
Brannick, 2010; Schmidt & Hunter; 1997). 
Another argument contrary to the view of Schmidt and Hunter (1997) might be 
advanced along the lines that researchers should use sample sizes of sufficient magnitude 
to ensure high power. Once again, however, this is problematic. Cozby (2004) shows that 
with a medium effect size and power of .8, which still possesses a 20% chance of failing 
to detect an effect, the number of required participants is in excess of a 100, a number 
beyond that which is feasible to obtain in many cases (Schmidt & Hunter; 1997). 
                                                           
12 Power is predicated on a combination of the type of statistical test, the sample size, significance level, 
and effect size, amongst other factors (Mulaik, Raju, & Harshman, 1997). 
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Replication and Confidence Intervals 
In 1966, Bakan pointed out that the referent for all probability considerations used in 
NHST is neither in the population nor the subjective confidence of the investigator. 
Rather, it is a hypothetical distribution of experiments all conducted in the same manner, 
only one of which is actually observed. Thus, it is replication of the experiment that 
validates the inference model (Bakan, 1960), and as Steiger (1990) famously declared: 
“An ounce of replication is worth a ton of inferential statistics.” (p.176).  
This point is validated by Cumming (2008) and further belies the view that NHST is a 
valid estimator of sampling uncertainty. Taking repeated, n=32 paired samples, from a 
standardised hypothetical normal distribution using a power level of .52, Cumming (2008) 
conducted 25 separate mean t-Tests. Though the overall results were as expected, in 
terms of power, with 12 of 25 experiments producing a p<.05 result, the variation in p 
values was extreme ranging from p<.001 to p=.706. As Cumming (2008) stated, 
“Carrying out such an experiment—as much of psychology spends its time doing—is 
equivalent to closing your eyes and randomly choosing 1 of the 25 experiments… A *** 
result (p < .001) is first prize in this p value lottery, and you need almost the luck of a 
lottery winner to obtain it.” (p. 288).  
Many authors have remarked that confidence intervals provide a better assessment of 
sampling uncertainty than NHST. For example, a 95% confidence interval will, on 
average, capture 83.4% of future replication means (Cumming & Finch, 2001; Fidler et 
al., 2004; Estes, 1997; Loftus, 1996). However, it appears few researchers are aware of 
this (Cumming, Williams, & Fidler, 2004). This finding, coupled with the minimal 
utilisation of confidence intervals in psychological research (Fidler et al., 2004), no doubt 
explains the continuing belief in NHST as a valid method for assessing sampling 
uncertainty. 
Summary 
NHST is a woefully inadequate method by which to derive valid statistical inferences. 
Many of the assumptions, though theoretically plausible, are in reality too restrictive with 
the result that they are often not adhered to in practice. Moreover, other assumptions, 
such as the independence of psychological phenomena and null hypotheses of zero 
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difference, are so unrealistic as to be farcical. Meehl’s conjecture illustrates the resulting 
problem: the null hypothesis is almost always, in reality, false.  
Were that the only problem with NHST, it would represent a serious, no doubt some 
would say potentially fatal, concern associated with its use. However, as Lindley’s 
paradox, sequence effects, extreme values and the several Bayesian statistical arguments 
all demonstrate, the logical foundation on which NHST is predicated is invalid. NHST 
can not tell researcher’s what they want, and need, to know.  
The argument that NHST is appropriately applied as a measure of assessing sampling 
uncertainty is similarly bankrupt. Its application in psychology is rarely viable and the 
lack of power, and moderate effect sizes, associated with most studies renders the 
argument even more suspect. Moreover, even if the erratic sampling results of Cumming 
(2008) could be dismissed, the truth is that confidence intervals are a much more 
informative tool for evaluating the degree of uncertainty in a sample than NHST. With 
the very rare exception of quality control situations, there is no legitimate reason for the 
continued use of NHST in psychology today. 
Given the logical, conceptual and philosophical inadequacies of NHST, one might 
conclude that it would be a method long forsaken in psychological research. This would 
be a false conclusion however. As the next section demonstrates, NHST remains the most 
misunderstood, misused, and misapplied research methodology in psychology. 
Depressingly, it is also remains the most common. 
Consequences of Null Hypothesis Significance 
Testing 
Growth 
A Growing Addiction 
Growth in the use of NHST in published journal articles boomed during the 1950s as part 
of the inference revolution (Gigerenzer, 2000). Since then use of NHST has continued to 
climb. Hubbard, Parsa, and Luthy (1997) tracked the uptake of NHST in the Journal of 
Applied Psychology from 1917 to 1994 and documented an increasing reliance on 
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statistical significance tests. Referencing more than a 1,000 articles, NHST was found to 
appear in only 17% of articles during the 1920s but over 90% of articles in the 1990s.  
The story is the same for other psychology journals. Picking an article at random from 
each year of publication for 12 APA journals, Hubbard and Ryan (2000) recorded the use 
of NHST from 1911 to 1998. On average NHST was used in 82.4% of the 8,001 articles 
sampled. However, the trend across decades was strongly non-linear with use exceeding 
90% since the 1970s.  
Saturation 
Hubbard (2008) provides more recent figures. Sampling 1,750 papers in the same 12 
psychology journals as Hubbard and Ryan (2000), Hubbard (2008) found the use of 
NHST averaged 94% between1990 and 2002. Indeed, The Journal of Developmental 
Psychology and The Journal of Abnormal Psychology both averaged more than 99%. 
Hagen (1997) highlights the consequence of such reliance: “NHST is … deeply 
embedded in our methods of statistical inference. It is unlikely that we will ever be able 
to divorce ourselves from that logic even if someday we decide that we want to.” (p. 22).  
Editorial Policy and Statistical Reform 
Editorial Encouragement 
The recognition of the deeply entrenched nature of NHST in psychology, and the 
shortcomings of NHST as a research methodology, has lead to calls for other tools of 
statistical inference to supplement the use of NHST. Most notably, the Task Force on 
Statistical Inference (TFSI) was convened by the Board of Scientific Affairs of the 
American Psychological Association in 1996 to evaluate and report on such methods. 
Along with suggestions on the use of power, experimental design, and graphical 
presentation, the TFSI recommended the use of confidence intervals and effect sizes in its 
final report: “It is hard to imagine a situation in which a dichotomous accept-reject 
decision is better than reporting an actual p value or, better still, a confidence 
interval…Always provide some effect size estimate when reporting a p value.” 
(Wilkinson and the Task Force on Statistical Inference, 1999, p. 599).  
These sentiments echoed earlier recommendations in the fourth edition of the APA’s 
Publication Manual where the reporting of effect sizes was encouraged (Kline, 2004; 
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Nickerson, 2000). These recommendation gained little traction, however, with effect 
sizes appearing in psychology journals between 1994 and 2000 in only 25% of articles, 
and even then few were actually interpreted (Kline, 2004). Similarly, between 1994 and 
1997, Geoffrey Loftus, then editor of Memory and Cognition, asked contributors to report 
their results with error bars rather than relying solely on statistical significance tests. 
Once again, in the rare cases where Loftus’ recommendation was heeded, authors 
invariably failed to use error bars for interpretative purposes (Cumming & Finch, 2001).  
A Dismal Failure 
More recently, Fidler et al. (2005) investigated the effects of the TFSI’s, and Phillip 
Kendall’s (1997), editorial recommendations by reviewing 239 articles in the Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology. They found little change in practices with effect 
sizes remaining little reported while confidence interval reporting peaked at a scant 17% 
in 2001. The same story is evident in education, public health, and counselling journals 
(Byrd, 2007; Fidler et al., 2004; Sink & Stroh, 2006). Finch, Cumming, and Thomason, 
(2001) best summarise these results. In noting that many important aspects of statistical 
inference in psychology remain the same today as it was in the 1940s, they concluded: 
“the cogent, sustained efforts of the reformers have been a dismal failure.” (p. 205).  
Confusions and Fallacies 
A Statistical Aberration 
Given the extreme, some might say pathological, reliance on NHST for statistical 
inference in psychology, one might think psychologists would possess an intimate and 
profound understanding of the methodology. Indeed, one might reckon it a rare thing for 
a psychologist to be caught unawares or answer a question regarding NHST incorrectly. 
Reality, however, shows this to be a far from accurate expectation. 
Although Tversky and Kahneman (1971) demonstrated a cognitive bias in many 
statistical experts with the belief in the law of small numbers13, it was Oakes (1986) who 
first unearthed evidence of statistical confusion in a pure psychology cohort. Asking 70 
academic psychologists for their interpretation of p <.01 via a choice of 7 statements, 
                                                           
13 This belief is that small samples are typical representations of populations, and that statistically 
significant results are likely to obtain with replication samples half the size of the original. 
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Oakes (1986) found only 8 (11%) gave the correct interpretation with almost 50% 
endorsing statements that p values indicated the conditional probability of either H0 or 
HA. Lest it be thought Oakes’ (1986) results were a statistical aberration, similar findings 
have been established by many other authors (Gigerenzer, Krauss, & Vitouch 2004; 
Haller & Krauss, 2002; Hubbard & Bayarri, 2003). 
Haller and Krauss (2002), for instance, provided 113 German psychology faculty with 
a statistical print out and asked them to answer questions concerning interpretation of the 
results, for example, whether the result absolutely disproved the null, provided evidence 
for the probability of making an incorrect decision, or gave reliability information 
concerning the probability of generating significant results in the long run. Depressingly, 
the best result from all groups was that of lecturers teaching statistical methods classes, 
80% of whom were found to agree with at least one erroneous statistical conception 
(Haller & Krauss, 2002). 
Common Confusions 
The most common fallacies and statistical misconceptions endorsed or believed by 
psychologists from the studies listed above included: 
• The Magnitude Fallacy: A p value is a numerical index of the size of an effect; 
thus, low p values indicate large effects. This is erroneous because it confuses 
the definitions of p and effect size. 
• The Replication Fallacy: A p value of .05 means that same results will replicate 
on 95% of future occasions. As illustrated by Cumming (2008), just because a 
significant result is obtained it does not necessarily hold that it will be 
replicated consistently.  
• Valid Research Fantasy: 1-p is the probability that the alternative hypothesis is 
true, i.e., a p<.05 gives a 95% probability of the alternate hypothesis being true. 
This is a gross misunderstanding; p(D/H0) ≠ p(H0/D), nor for that matter 
p(HA/D). 
• Odds Against Chance Fallacy: The p value is the probability that the research 
results are due to chance. This is incorrect because p values are calculated on 
the premise that sampling error is the only thing that causes the sample statistic 
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to deviate from the null hypothesis. That is, the likelihood of sampling error is 
already taken to be 1.00 when a statistical test is conducted because H0 is 
assumed to be true. 
• Inverse Probability Fallacy/ Bayesian Wishful Thinking: A p value is the 
probability that the null hypothesis is true, thus, p<.05 implies p(H0/D) < .05. 
As with the valid research fantasy, p values are conditional on the data, not on 
the null hypothesis; (p(D/H0) ≠ p(H0/D)). 
• Statistical Significance Equals Scientific Significance: This fallacy ignores the 
fact that statistical significance says nothing about the size/importance of an 
effect. As Meehl’s conjecture makes clear, with a large enough sample size 
almost any arbitrary comparison is significant. 
• P and α Confusion: P values and alpha levels (α) are the same thing. As noted 
by Hubbard and Bayarri (2003) the p comes from the Fisherian school of 
thought and represents a probability concerned with measures of evidence, 
whereas α concerns the long run relative frequency of error in the Neyman-
Pearson paradigm.  
Meaningless Applications 
Such confusion and misconception has engendered a retardation of the cumulative 
development of psychological knowledge (Schmidt & Hunter, 1997; Meehl, 1978). By 
assuming significant statistical results are automatically veracious, meaningful, and 
important, effort has been diverted away from critical appraisal of data and the tasks of 
replication, two fundamental principles of scientific analysis (Kline, 2004). Additionally, 
the lack of replication, coupled with the obsessive focus on statistical thresholds has 
created a file drawer problem, whereby, studies that fail to reject the null are filed away 
and never submitted for publication (Meehl, 1997, 1967; Rosenthal, 1979). As Hubbard 
(2008) duly summarises: “The end result is that applications of classical statistical testing 
in psychology are largely meaningless.” (p.297). 
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Summary 
It may be seen then, that Hagen (1997) was more right than even he realised. Not only 
have researchers demonstrated an almost obsessive aversion to desisting with the practice 
of NHST, there has been a substantial rejection of supplementing the practice with other 
methods such as effect sizes or confidence intervals. As the research reported above 
attests, NHST remains at, or close to, saturation point in many journals, with some 
comprised entirely of studies using NHST methods. Concordantly, and despite the best 
efforts of many editors and boards of standards, the use of effect sizes and confidence 
intervals remains of trivial magnitude.  
The utter lack of recourse to other methods of statistical inference by itself constitutes 
grounds for serious consternation, given the follies delineated earlier. However, this issue 
is greatly exacerbated by the atrocious levels of understanding of NHST evinced by many 
psychologists. The resulting faltering application has not only severely retarded the 
cumulative development of knowledge in psychology, it has also harmed “the usefulness 
of psychological research as a means for solving practical problems in society” (Schmidt 
& Hunter, 1997, p. 449). 
Conclusion 
Hybridisation 
William Sealy Gosset was a major force in the creation of the various tools of statistical 
inference that are endorsed and used in modern psychology. Despite this, in usurping 
Gosset’s statistical tables and calculations, and publishing two of the most influential 
statistics texts of the 20th century, it is to Sir Ronald Fisher that most recognition for 
significance testing procedures is now accorded. The subsequent criticism and extension 
by Neyman and Pearson, and the practical pressures of the inference revolution, acted as 
the genesis for the hybridised methodology used by many researchers today. It is, 
however, a bastardised sundry of statistical theory that has resulted in misconception, 
misunderstanding, and misapplication within psychology. 
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The Sterile Rake 
Whereas many assumptions of NHST are restrictive, and are not verified by researchers, 
others are a travesty of realist philosophy. When combined with the invalid logical 
foundations of NHST, the results include the assaults of Meehl’s conjecture, Lindley’s 
paradox, and Rorer’s extreme values argument. The much touted defence of NHST as a 
means of assessing sampling uncertainty is similarly laid waste by Cumming’s (2008) 
replication research and Schmidt and Hunter’s (1997) power arguments. Meehl’s (1967) 
description of researchers employing NHST as sterile intellectual rakes who leave behind 
a long train of ravished maidens but no viable scientific offspring remains germane. 
The Deleterious Effects 
The use of NHST procedures in modern psychology has reached saturation point. 
Further, attempts by reformers to encourage the utilisation of other tools of statistical 
inference to supplement NHST have been abysmal failures. This situation has only been 
aggravated by the miserable knowledge evidenced by research concerning psychologist’s 
understanding of NHST. Tryon’s (1998) comments cogently illustrate the consequences 
of such findings: “. . . the fact that statistical experts and investigators publishing in the 
best journals cannot consistently interpret the results of these analyses is extremely 
disturbing. Seventy-two years of education have resulted in miniscule, if any, progress 
toward correcting this situation. It is difficult to estimate the handicap that widespread, 
incorrect, and intractable use of a primary data analytic method has on a scientific 
discipline, but the deleterious effects are undoubtedly substantial.” (p. 796). 
Conclusion 
It should be of little comfort to psychologists that similar problems with the application 
of NHST are evident in the research literatures of economics, ecology, and epidemiology 
(Ziliak & McCloskey; 2008). Neither should the supplemental tools of effect sizes and 
confidence intervals be regarded as a perfect salvation for they are not also without issue 
in application (Chow, 1996). Or as Kline (2004) has remarked, placing candles on a cow 
pie does not make a birthday cake. 
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It might be thought that reverting to using either the Neyman-Pearson method or 
Fisher’s original testing procedures would improve things. However, as Haig (2011) 
notes, neither is adequate for the role psychologists would have them perform and this no 
doubt explains, in part, the attraction in trying to combine them. The Neyman-Pearson 
approach fails to yield inferences with respect to any specific hypothesis and is limited to 
applications consonant with quality control situations which are rare in psychological 
research. Similarly, without an alternative hypothesis, and predicated on the null being 
true, Fishers significance testing cannot, therefore, also be a direct yardstick for 
adjudicating whether the null is false (Haig, 2011). 
There are many alternatives and supplemental tools to NHST procedures for the 
analysis of data and derivation of statistical inference. Bayesianism, meta analysis, and 
the neo-Fisherian paradigm are but several of the examples. Though no clear alternative 
to NHST has emerged (Ferguson, 2009), and each contender has its own weaknesses and 
issues, this should not detract researchers from examining, evaluating, and employing 
them as means allow and circumstances dictate. Proper psychological research involves 
critical thinking, or to paraphrase Tukey (1969), it is detective work, not the ritualised 
application of any one technique.  
  What’s Still Wrong with Psychology Anyway? 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 61 
Chapter 4: Interindividual Versus Intraindividual 
Research and the Granularity of Research 
Methods  
An Idiographic-Nomothetic Debate? 
Origins 
Allport 
It is commonly believed that the terms idiographic and nomothetic were introduced into 
the psychology lexicon by Gordon Allport in 1937 with the publication of his Personality: 
A Psychological Interpretation. Runyan (1983), Lamiell (1998), and Krauss (2008) are 
several authors crediting Allport with borrowing the terms from the philosopher Wilhelm 
Windelband (1894/1998): “The proposal to distinguish sharply between the study of 
general principles and the study of the individual case has taken many…forms. The 
philosopher Windelband, for example, proposed to separate the nomothetic from the 
idiographic disciplines.” (Allport, 1937, p. 22; italics in original). However, the terms 
were actually used in psychology for the first time nearly 40 years earlier. 
Munsterberg 
It was in 1899, during a presidential address to the American Psychology Association, 
that Hugo Munsterberg first used the terms idiographic and nomothetic in a psychology 
context. In the address, published in Psychological Review a month later, Munsterberg 
(1899/ 1994) highlighted the difference between sciences which seek isolated facts and 
those which seek laws: “...and thus we have two groups of sciences which have nothing 
to do with each other, sciences which describe the isolated facts and sciences which seek 
their laws. A leading logician baptizes the first, therefore, idiographic sciences, the latter, 
nomothetic sciences” (p.231-232). The leading logician in the above is likely to have 
been Windelband who influenced Munsterberg in the 1890s while both were members of 
the Southwestern School of neo-Kantianism (Hurlburt & Knapp, 2006).  
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Stern 
It is uncertain whether Allport was introduced to Windelband’s thinking directly or 
indirectly. Though Munsterberg was Allport’s first teacher at Harvard and Allport’s 
brother, Floyd, was Munsterberg’s research assistant, Allport was heavily influenced by 
another Munsterberg disciple, William Stern: “…from Stern in particular I learned that a 
chasm exists between the common variety of differential psychology . . . and a truly 
personalistic psychology that focuses upon the organization, not the mere profiling of an 
individual’s traits” (Allport, 1967, p. 10). Indeed, many of Allport’s general ideas show 
Stern’s influence (Ghougassian, 1972). Although Allport may be credited with 
popularising the terms within psychology, especially personality psychology, the 
idiographic/nomothetic distinction in psychology can be seen to exist prior to Allport, 
thanks to Munsterberg (Hurlburt & Knapp, 2006). 
Definitional Confusion 
A Disorganised Discussion 
Issues concerning definitions within science are very important as ill-specified meanings 
can lead to conceptual confusion and misallocation of research resources. Borsboom, 
Mellenbergh, and Van Heerden (2004), for example, have suggested changes in the term 
validity have hindered progress on validity research by focusing attention on differing, 
exterior facets of validity at the expense of the core concept. Similarly, it can be seen that 
issues concerning nomothetic and idiographic research in psychology have been plagued 
by definitional confusion. At various times, for example, the idiographic-nomothetic 
research debate has concerned the comprehensiveness and usefulness of personality traits 
(e.g., Allport, 1937; Block, 1995; Cervone, 2005), individual uniqueness (e.g., Allport, 
1937, 1962; Higgins, 1990), quantitative versus qualitative research (e.g., Allport, 1962; 
Meehl, 1954), the status of psychology as a science (e.g., Eysenck, 1954; Holt, 1962; 
Krauss, 2008; Nunnally, 1967), and the study of individuals versus the study of groups 
(e.g., Allport, 1962; Bem & Allen, 1974; Lamiell, 1987, 2003; Runyan, 1983). As such, 
the discourse is better characterised as a disorganised discussion of slightly related terms 
than as a true debate (Krauss, 2008). 
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Windelband and the Emerging Discipline 
In order to understand how the idiographic-nomothetic debate has evolved, it is necessary 
to contrast the original views of Windelband with later incarnations. Windelband first 
used the terms idiographic and nomothetic in 1884 in a speech marking his assumption of 
rectorship at the University of Strasbourg on its 273rd anniversary. For Windelband, no 
strict division between humanities and natural sciences could readily accommodate the 
emerging science of psychology: “…an empirical discipline of such significance as 
psychology is not to be accommodated by the categories of the natural sciences and the 
humanities: to judge by its subject, it can only be characterised as a humanity, and in a 
certain sense as the foundations of all of the others; but its entire procedure, its 
methodological arsenal, is from beginning to end that of the natural sciences.” 
(Windelband, 1884/1998, p.11). It is within this context that the terms idiographic and 
nomothetic were later applied: “So we may say that the empirical sciences seek in the 
knowledge of reality either the general in the form of the natural law or the particular in 
the historically determined form (Gestalt)...The one comprise sciences of law, the other 
science of events; the former teach us what always is, the latter what once was. If one 
may resort to neologisms, it can be said that scientific thought is in the one case 
nomothetic, in the other idiographic.” (Windelband, 1894/1998, p.13).  
Lost in Translation 
Of particular relevance in the quotations above are the connotations associated with the 
terms natural sciences and humanities. In German they are termed Naturwissenschaften 
and Geisteswissenchaften respectively, and Windelband saw them as two complementary 
components of empirical science, die Erfahrungswissenschaften (Lamiell, 1998). Thus, 
just as there could be scientific thought associated with what always is, so Windelband 
believed there could be scientific thought with what once was. However, in English a 
connotation of scientific or generalised knowledge for the humanities is lacking 
(Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). 
For Windelband, nomothetic knowledge represents what is true for each and every 
human or collective, e.g., the law of gravity. Idiographic knowledge is then concerned 
with unique events, entities, and trends, but with the level of analysis crucially left open. 
Such an investigation might focus on a single human being but it might also focus on an 
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entire race, a cultural custom, or a specific dialect within a language. In sum, 
Windelband’s conception of nomothetic and idiographic hung on differences between 
constraints of time and context, not of the unit of analysis (Kraus, 2008; Lamiell, 1998; 
Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010).  
The Real Issue  
Inconsistent Application and Boundary Conditions 
Though Allport, and for that matter Munsterberg, shared Windelband’s view that both 
nomothetic and idiographic research were complementary and that psychology should 
employ both approaches, it is unfortunate how Allport choose to use the terms. Being 
more interested in examining the behaviour of single individuals, Allport typically used 
the term idiographic to refer to the study of individuals, and the term nomothetic to refer 
to the study of populations and groups (Krauss, 2008). Moreover, as with other authors, 
Allport’s use was not always consistent and the terms nomothetic and idiographic were 
used interchangeably with understanding and explanation, morphogenic and 
dimensional, and the particular and the general, amongst others (Allport, 1962; Krauss, 
2008; Runyan, 1983).  
The consequence of such inconsistency has seen researchers arguing to and fro about 
where the boundary between idiographic and nomothetic research lies. Some have 
contended that idiographic research is defined by that which holds for a subset of the 
population and, therefore, that interaction and moderating effects are idiographic in 
nature. Others, however, have pointed out that interaction terms added to regression 
equations, standard staples of nomothetic research, can also accommodate such 
classifications (Krauss, 2008). Similarly, studies that compare the level of variables in a 
person have been framed as both idiographic when focused on number of participants but 
nomothetic when viewed by number of observations (Epstein, 1979). 
A Spurious Distinction 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe wrote that: “the particular is ever subordinate to the 
general; the general must ever accommodate the particular.” (cited in Lamiell, 1998, 
p.30). A similar sentiment can be seen in Windelband’s original use. All science is 
idiographic in the sense of being what once was, that is every event is time and context 
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sensitive, but it allows for nomothetic generalisations when further instances are also 
seen as what once was as well (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). The idiographic-nomothetic 
debate in psychology can be rightly seen as a misnomer then, the terms nomothetic and 
idiographic having been misconstrued as adversarial when in fact they represent two 
sides of the same empirical coin.  
Granularity and the Fragmentation of Research Methods 
The issue of real import for psychology associated with idiographic-nomothetic 
definitions is that of granularity of research methods, i.e., at which level, and by which 
methods, research should be conducted to generate the best psychological knowledge. 
Contemporary psychology has progressively identified itself as a nomothetic science but 
where nomotheticity has been taken to mean ergodicity of psychological phenomena 
(Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). That is, an individual’s variability (intraindividual 
variation) has been assumed to be identical to the variation between persons within a 
given population (interindividual variation) (Grice, Jackson, & McDaniel, 2006; 
Molenaar, 2004).  
The result has been a fragmentation of psychological science (Salvatore & Valsiner, 
2010). In stark contrast with Windelband, and for that matter Allport’s earlier harmonious 
conception, two diametrically opposed methodological research views have ensued. The 
first is concerned with the averages and aggregates of people and groups of people, 
interindividual variation (IEV), whereas a contrasting approach focuses on the study of 
events and dispositions within a single individual history, intraindividual variation (IAV) 
(Krauss, 2008; Molenaar, 2004; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). In the former case, 
regression analysis, correlations, t-Tests, and ANOVAs are the most common analytical 
tools; in the latter, visual analysis of single-case designs predominates (Saville, 2008). 
The Dominance of Interindividual Research 
The Early Balance 
Today the dominant tradition in psychology takes a large-N, group, or IEV approach to 
conducting research (Blampied, 1999; Krauss, 2008; Molenaar, 2004; Saville, 2004). 
However, this was not always the case. Danziger (1990), has shown that during the 
period 1914-1916 the ratio of published intraindividual to interindividual research was 
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more than 2 to 1 in several leading psychology journals. Indeed, the American Journal of 
Psychology held an almost 3 to 1 ratio with IAV methods utilised in 70% of all studies 
whereas IEV methods were employed in only 25% of total publications (Danziger, 1990). 
Decline of IAV Research 
These numbers shifted dramatically, however, and by the 1950s IEV research comprised 
more than 80% of articles in the same journals (Danziger, 1990). The serious decline in 
published IAV research is best exemplified by the 31 to 1 ratio of IEV to IAV research 
exhibited in the Journal of Educational Psychology (Danziger, 1990). The situation 
remains similar today with Molenaar (2004) lamenting that only one research program 
within psychometrics is dedicated to purely IAV research, namely, Nesselroade's work on 
P-technique which employs factor analyses of a single-participant’s multivariate time 
series to investigate individual personality (Molenaar, 2004). 
Contemporary Figures 
To illustrate the complete dominance of IEV methodology within psychology, several 
searches were performed using PSYClit, PSYCinfo and PSYCarticles databases. Search 
parameters were confined to empirical articles between 2000 and 2010 with a personality 
subject and returned more than 41,000 articles. Adding the keywords idiographic, single-
case, and intraindividual to the same search parameters, however, resulted in only 71, 48, 
and 67 articles returned respectively. This would seem to add much credence to Lamiell’s 
(1998) contention that modern trait psychology has become a demographical exercise 
exploiting a psychology vocabulary. 
No Behavioural Bastion  
The figures for trait and personality psychology are not a statistical aberration with 
journals traditionally dedicated to IAV research, notably journals emerging from the 
behaviour therapy revolution of the 1960’s with its initial emphasis on the scientific study 
of individual cases (e.g., Shapiro, 1966) also showing a marked change in methodological 
focus. Forsyth et al. (1999) tracked the number of single subject and group designs in the 
journal Behavior Therapy since its inception in 1970. Spanning 27 volumes and 1690 
articles, the review showed single-subject designs peaked in the early 1970s at more than 
40% but after the late 1980s they never made up more than 20% of total published work. 
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By contrast, group designs had consistently accounted for more than 40% of all articles 
since the late 1970s.  
Similar results were obtained in a second expanded study comprising the journals 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, and 
Behavior Modification for the time period 1974 through to 1997. Once again, all three 
journals showed the same decline in single-case designs. For example, since the mid 
1980s single-case designs have never comprised more than 5% of all articles in the 
journal Behavior Research and Therapy. As a result, Forsyth et al. (1999) concluded that 
behaviour therapy had drifted from its ideological roots of single-case/single-subject 
methods toward the disproportionate use of group methods.  
Summary 
Though popularised by Allport, the terms idiographic and nomothetic were introduced 
into psychology by Munsterberg in 1894. Inaccurate translation and inconsistent use has 
meant these terms have ignited spurious debates within psychology. Issues ranging from 
individual and group differences, to differences in qualitative and quantitative research, 
to the status of psychology as a science, and the usefulness of personality traits have all 
been enveloped by the idiographic-nomothetic discourse. However, when viewed through 
the lens of Windelband’s original conception such debate is seen as misguided, with 
nomothetic laws and idiographic peculiarities comprising two sides of the same scientific 
coinage.  
Though somewhat obscured by the terminological verbiage, the real issue to emerge 
from the idiographic-nomothetic debate concerns the granularity of psychology’s 
research methods. A methodological split in the psychological research tradition has 
occurred along interindividual (IEV) and intraindividual (IAV) lines. Whereas IAV 
methods dominated early psychological research, it is an IEV research paradigm that 
typifies research practice today, with psychological science being increasingly defined by 
the limitations of statistical procedure (Borsboom, 2005). In order to understand the 
evolution of psychology’s research tradition further, a look back at early developments is 
now undertaken. 
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 A Brief History of Psychological Research 
Methodology 
Early Flux 
The rigid tradition that has come to dominate psychological research since the inference 
revolution mentioned earlier is a direct result of developments occurring during the early 
half of the 20th Century (Danziger, 1990). Until the 1940s, psychology was characterised 
by an eclectic mixture of research approaches and methods. This was a direct 
consequence of the various techniques employed in psychology’s inception that were 
borrowed and adapted from biology, physiology, neurophysiology, and experimental 
medicine amongst other fields (Blampied, 1999; Danziger, 1990). Broadly construed, 
however, there were two schools of research that dominated these early periods, the 
Wundtian and the Galtonian. 
The Wundtian School  
Borrowing methods from experimental physiology and grounded in an introspective 
rationale, Wundt sought to manipulate the conditions of internal perception via 
psychological experimentation, such that objective report and observation could occur 
(Danziger, 1990). Experimentation, however, was only one part of the Wundtian 
paradigm, with Volkerpsychologie14 also accorded an objective, and no less important, 
role supplementing “physics in the investigation of the total content of experience” 
(Wundt, 1897/1990, cited in Danziger, 1990, p.38). As such, communication and the 
subjective elements of individual perception were important components of Wundtian 
research with the experimenter and participant frequently changing places to deepen 
understanding of perceptual processes.  
The Galtonian Paradigm 
The alternation of experimenter and participant roles was but one element of the 
Wundtian paradigm rejected by psychologists following a Galtonian rationale. Thorndike 
                                                           
14 Volkerpsychologie is a German term with no clear English equivalent but which most closely refers to a 
social psychology based on historical, ethnographic and comparative analysis of human cultural products, 
particularly language (Danziger, 1990).  
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(1911), for example, saw role swapping as unnecessarily subjective, viewing such 
procedures as primarily for the benefit of the participant at the expense of experimenter. 
Whereas Wundt worried about the segregation of mental processes from social and 
cultural factors, proponents of the Galtonian school were interested solely in abilities 
divorced from everything else (Danziger, 1990). As noted earlier in the measurement 
chapter, comparison and relative standing amongst individuals, stemming from Galton’s 
fascination with individual differences, was the prime methodological rational 
perpetuated and extended by Cattell, Thorndike, and other proponents of the mental 
measurement movement. 
The Rise of Interindividual Research 
Practical Usurpation  
By the 1920s the Wundtian school had began to lose out to the Galtonian one and several 
factors were responsible. Firstly, educational administrators began to utilise and apply 
psychological principles to the measurement, comparison, and evaluation of students, 
teaching methods, and educational conditions (Danziger, 1990). Secondly, WW1 and the 
US army alpha and beta tests created a huge demand for psychological testing (Gould, 
1981). Combined, these two factors represented a strong spur for practical applications of 
psychology research which began to infiltrate, and impact on, the psychological research 
domain. Although laboratory methods were not abandoned in favour of mental testing, 
increasingly, laboratory work began to focus on groups of participants rather than 
individuals and basic research began more and more to resemble applied research 
(Danziger, 1990). 
Social and Statistical Motivations 
This trend towards group research was given further impetus with the emergence of 
private research foundations, such as the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, which 
sought to use research to achieve socially desirable ends (Danziger, 1990). Fisher’s 
publication of Statistical Methods for Research Workers (1925), which emphasised the 
estimation of population parameters from small samples based on Fisher’s experience with 
the sampling of agricultural commodities (discussed in chapter 3), and the introduction of 
Stevens’ four scales (discussed in chapter 2) were two developments in statistical 
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psychology that further perpetuated the growth of group based research. When these 
developments were coupled with demand from the U.S. Government for research during 
the Great Depression, a synthesis in psychological research began to form (Danziger, 
1990; Saville, 2008). Combining the practice of random subject assignment of 
experimental research with correlational and sampling statistics driven by the mental 
testing movement, the study of individuals was pushed off the research agenda by a focus 
on attributes of groups and populations (Lamiell, 1998). By the 1940s, this focus had 
become the dominant tradition within psychology discipline, a situation Danziger (1990) 
called “The triumph of the aggregate” (p.68). 
Dissenters and Decline 
There were several notable dissenters who were critical of what psychological science 
had become. The earliest was Boring (1919), who opined that statistical fascination 
divorced from intimacy with fundamental observations led nowhere. Another prominent 
critic was Skinner, who in his 1938 treatise, The Behavior of Organisms, first outlined his 
radical behaviorist approach to the scientific study of behaviour - a position famously 
expressed in his later work: “...instead of studying a thousand rats for one hour each or a 
hundred rats for ten hours each the investigator is more likely to study one rat for a 
thousand hours’’ (Skinner, 1966, p. 21). 
Indeed, it was the success of the Skinnerian philosophy that led to a modest re-
emergence of single subject designs in the 1950s and 1960s (Saville, 2008). Another 
contributing factor was the demand in applied research for studies that used fewer 
participants (Saville, 2008). Despite this re-emergence, and as illustrated above, even 
research with a decidedly intraindividual and/or behavioural orientation had given way to 
utilising interindividual methodologies by the end of the 21st Century. 
Summary 
Early psychological research methodology was characterised by an amalgamation of 
research practices and standards imported from other disciplines such as medicine and 
physiology. The Wundtian and Galtonian methodological schools emerged with the 
former focused on individual experimentation and socio-cultural elements and the latter 
concerned with individual differences amongst the attributes of people. Demand for 
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applied psychological research from educational and military sources drove changes in 
laboratory research away from the study of individuals toward groups of participants.  
This shift was further advanced by private research foundations, statistical 
developments, and concern for social research emanating from the Great Depression. 
Despite criticism from several prominent psychologists and the rise of behaviourism 
during the 1950s and 1960s, interindividual research has remained the dominant research 
paradigm since the middle of the century. As such, contemporary psychology is 
characterised by a fascination with what is common to an aggregate rather than what is 
universal to all.  
Other than historical, social, and cultural factors, one might wonder what other reasons 
may have contributed to the overwhelming popularity of IEV research displayed in the 
psychology literature today. Surely, if IAV methods were useful to researchers would 
they not be employed? Similarly, were there drawbacks to an IEV approach, would not 
less IEV research be evident in the literature? The next sections answer both these 
questions by evaluating the arguments advanced for and against IEV and IAV research.  
An Evaluation of Inter and Intra Individual 
Research Methodology 
Intraindividual Research 
Generalisability 
A common view of psychology is that its primary goal is the “the development of 
generalizations of ever increasing scope, so that greater and greater varieties of 
phenomena may be explained by them, larger and larger numbers of questions answered 
by them, and broader and broader reaching predictions and decisions based upon them” 
(Levy, 1970, p. 5). According to this view, generalisations, once obtained, can be applied 
at the level of the individual by a process of deduction. Without such generalisations, 
however, it is contended that no proper scientific investigation is possible. Psychology 
without generalisation to universal laws is not science, but only a hope of science (James, 
1961), and psychology without generalisation to individuals cannot be of any material 
use (Blampied, 1999). 
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The most withering criticism of IAV research concerns its proposed lack of 
generalisability. IAV research has been labelled an antiscience view that discourages the 
search for general laws (Nunnally, 1978). Holt (1962) called it an approach that is 
impossible for gaining useful information within psychology and Nunnally (1968) opined 
it was a view that allowed for only chaos to prevail in the description of human nature. 
Bem and Allen (1974) best illustrate the prevailing consensus remarking that IAV 
research is commonly characterised as “a scientific dead end, a capitulation to the man-
in-the street view that a science of psychology is impossible because everybody is 
different from everybody else.” (p.511).  
However, the stirring rhetoric is ill informed. As argued by Windelband (1898/1994), 
there is nothing inherently unscientific about studying individuals with valid statistical 
and non-statistical enquiry being as possible with singular subjects as with populations 
(Blampied, 1999; Molenaar, 2004; Runyan, 1983; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). The 
research by Ebbinghaus on memory, by Pavlov on respondent conditioning, by 
Thorndike on instrumental conditioning, by Yerkes on comparative cognition, and 
Broca’s work on neuropsychology all stand as incontrovertible testament to the utility of 
single-subject studies (Blampied, 1999). Indeed, it is the study of individuals and a focus 
on direct and systematic replication that best exemplify a cumulative research tradition 
that affords robust, empirical generalisations (Lamiell, 1998; Runyan, 1983; Salvatore & 
Valsiner, 2010; Saville, 2008; Sidman, 1960). 
 Efficiency 
Another popular related criticism of IAV research suggests that it is not only impractical 
but logically impossible to conduct properly. Murray (1938) is an early example, 
asserting that “If individuals are as dissimilar as Allport suggests, then every sparrow 
would have to be separately identified, named and intuitively understood.” (p. 715). 
Similarly, Levy (1970) argued that if individuals were truly unique then psychologists 
would have to formulate as many theories as people in the universe. Concordantly, 
Tuerlinckx (2004) highlighted economic issues with IAV research suggesting it was 
easier to engage participants for one-time studies rather than those which necessitated 
follow up meetings and additional longitudinal considerations. 
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It is of course logistically impossible to study each and every individual and/or their 
behaviour. However, this criticism applies equally to IEV research. As Saville (2008) 
notes, sourcing and administration of the large number of participants required in IEV 
research can be problematic. Molenaar (2004) also illustrates how technology such as on-
line electronic screening measures, automatic scoring procedures for audio-visual 
registrations, and computational protocol analysis has made IAV research increasingly 
efficient. Similarly, the argument advanced by Levy (1970) is readily seen as 
misconstrued. Every human will of course differ in some way from another; however, 
he/she will also be representative of all humans in other respects. As demonstrated in the 
following sections, the study of the particular can lead to generalised knowledge (Allport, 
1937, 1962; Epstein, 2010; Lamiell, 1981; Molenaar, 2004). 
Causal Attributions 
A further major criticism levelled at IAV research concerns the nature of causal 
attributions. In part this stems from the criticism above, that little faith in causal 
attributions can be afforded given unique and substantial human variability (Levy, 1970; 
Murray, 1938). The nature of single-subject designs, particularly the repeated 
measurement elements, is the other major component of this criticism. As Tuerlinckx 
(2004) argues, a repeated mood questionnaire might be unproblematic but any repeated 
ability test or measure will be confounded by complications such as learning, memory, 
and carry over effects. 
The causal attribution contentions of Levy (1970) and Murray (1938) is renounced as 
above. That is, given enough replication and studious examination, increasing confidence 
for general principles extracted from particular instances can be engendered. Tuerlinckx’s 
(2004) argument is more cogent but there exist a range of design considerations in single-
subject research that allow for accurate causal attributions to be inferred. Multiple 
baseline designs, statistical filtering techniques, and reversal designs are but several 
germane examples (Molenaar, 2004; Saville, 2008).  
Benefits of IAV Research  
Indeed, it is the repeated measurement of variables that is a key strength of IAV research. 
Perone (1999), suggests that measuring the dependent variable only once, as is common 
in IEV research, precludes the intensive interaction with data that facilitates a true 
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understanding of research phenomena. Repeated measures also allow participants to 
experience all treatment conditions and can help researchers to identify and control 
further extraneous factors that may be introducing unwanted variability into a study 
(Saville, 2008).  
An additional benefit with IAV research concerns the nature of data analysis. Whereas 
IEV research typically uses test of significance and statistical aggregation for inferring 
causality, IAV research typically relies on visual analysis for experimental inference. 
This enables researchers to uncover patterns of coherence that might be otherwise 
overlooked with IEV research and develop more effective treatment measures (Cervone, 
2005; Haynes, Mumma, & Pinson, 2009; Saville, 2008; Tukey, 1969). As noted by 
Parker and Hagen-Burke (2007), by being able to simultaneously detect curvilinear 
trends, repeating patterns or cycles in data, delayed or lagged responses following 
intervention onset, and within-phase changes in variability along with changes in mean 
levels and trend slope across phases, visual analysis displays an inferential power 
unequalled by any other analytic technique.  
To understand how patterns of intraindividual variability may be missed in IEV 
research, consider an example given by Cervone and Shoda (1999) depicted in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: The loss of personality variability when considered in aggregate. Reprinted with permission from Cervone and Shoda, 
1999, p.30. 
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Person 1 tends to be happy when left alone and becomes irritated by frequent social 
interaction, whereas Person 2 becomes irritated when being ignored. Given situations A 
and C which feature few social interactions, and situations B and D which include 
frequent social contacts, it is likely Person 1 will be unfriendly in Situations B and D, but 
not A and C, with the pattern reversed for Person 2. While both may exhibit the same 
degree of friendliness across the four situations when considered in aggregate, all 
evidence of consistent personality variability is lost. 
Interindividual Research 
The Prime Premise 
A prime goal of psychological science is to discover functional relations among 
independent variables over and above the welter of environmental and biological 
variables influencing an organism at any given time (Barlow & Nock, 2009). The 
premise underlying modern IEV approaches is that such variability can be overcome with 
recourse to advanced statistical techniques which look through such error and extract, 
valid, general psychological laws from the study of groups of individuals (Barlow & 
Nock, 2009; Epstein, 2010; Krauss, 2008; Lamiell, 1998; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). 
Sidman (1960) sagely explicates this strategy: “The rationale for statistical 
immobilization of unwanted variables is based on the assumed random nature of such 
variables. In a large group of subjects, the reasoning goes, the uncontrolled factor will 
change the behaviour of some subjects in one direction and will affect the remaining 
subjects in the opposite away. When the data are averaged over all the subjects, the 
effects of the uncontrolled variables are presumed to add algebraically to zero. The 
composite data are then regarded as though they were representative of one ideal subject 
who had never been exposed to the uncontrolled variables at all.” (p. 162). 
Implicit within such an approach are several complementary assumptions. The first is 
that which is true of a sample is true of a population. A second assumption presumes that 
which is true at one time will also be true at another, while a third assumes that which is 
true of a group is true for individuals within that group (Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Krauss, 
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2008; Molenaar, 2004; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). There are, however, serious reasons 
to doubt all three assumptions. 
Sampling 
The case of the representativeness of samples of populations used in modern IEV 
research is highly suspect. As illustrated earlier in the chapter on null hypothesis 
significance testing, participants in the majority of psychological studies represent 
convenience samples comprising a homogenised cohort of university students, and 
researchers often make no attempt to define the population of which the samples are 
purported to be representative (Kline, 2004). Standard errors are likely to be understated, 
with the result that the statistical significance of such research is likely to be overstated 
(Reichardt & Gollob, 1999). Additionally, researchers are likely to generalise such results 
outside the bounds of such narrow samples (Saville, 2008). Ultimately, both of these 
practices can greatly misrepresent the conclusions drawn from the outcomes of a single 
IEV study (Wilkinson and the Task Force on Statistical Inference, 1999). 
Cross-Situational Consistency 
In a famous critique of personality psychology, Mischel (1968) showed that the cross-
situational consistency of IEV research was often surprisingly low. The criticism ignited 
a person-situation debate that lasted throughout the 1970s and generated a sense of 
paradigm crisis (Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Shoda, 1999). Eventually, however, a trait 
revival was sparked by Epstein (1979) amongst others, who showed that stable situational 
personality dispositions resulted when behaviour was aggregated over a reasonable 
number of occurrences (Epstein, 1979; Cervone & Shoda, 1999). Thus, rather than 
detract from the process of aggregation, Mischel’s (1968) criticism had provided another 
example of the benefits: “As a consequence, the scientific study of personality 
dispositions, which has been cast into doldrums in the1970s, is again an intellectually 
vigorous enterprise’’ (Goldberg, 1993, p. 26). 
The key element overlooked by IEV proponents is that Epstein’s (1979) paper also laid 
the foundation for a repudiation of the assumptions underpinning IEV research. This is 
best illustrated by Epstein’s comments in the discussion section of his paper: “This 
indicates that one can predict average behavior accurately from a similar sample of 
average behavior. However, the prediction is only actuarial and is a far cry from 
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predicting with confidence to individual instances of behavior… it should be noted that 
not everyone is equally predictable. This was demonstrated in the present article by the 
finding that within-subject correlations varied over a range that suggested almost, no 
stability in a few individuals and extremely high stability in others, with most individuals 
demonstrating a moderately high degree of stability.” (p. 1123-1124). That is, although 
aggregation helped demonstrate situational consistency in some individuals, it was by no 
means universal. Since Epstein (1970), findings that people differ in response tendencies, 
rates of change, and patterns of variability across contexts, in ways that cannot be 
captured by mean response levels, have been demonstrated by numerous researchers 
(Cervone, 1997; Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Epstein, 2010; Hemenover 2003; Shoda, 1999; 
Vansteelandt & Van Mechelen 2004). Perhaps the strongest refutation of the IEV 
approach concerns the assumption that individuals within groups can be characterised by 
aggregated statistics. 
Group and Individual Differences 
As noted above, the universal and unquestioned adoption of group averaging of data in 
psychology emerged as a by product of statistical advances and practical imperatives that 
precipitated the inference revolution. The ideological roots of the application of statistical 
aggregation to evaluating psychological attributes are far older, however, and can be 
traced to Quetelet, who in 1844 argued that the normal curve that had been applied to 
astronomical errors could also be used to define l'homme moyen15 (Kasser, 2006; Stigler, 
1992). Though statistical aggregation is often an appropriate strategy for making 
inferences from samples to populations in domains such as agronomy or quality control, 
where data are so numerous to preclude examination of every instance, and where inter-
individual variation in properties are usually not of any concern, there are good reasons to 
question statistical aggregation when applied to psychological phenomena (Bakan, 1966; 
Blampied, 2011; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010).   
As highlighted by Molenaar (2004), classical theorems of ergodic mathematics16 
illustrate that most psychological processes are non-ergodic. That is, the structures of 
                                                           
15 L’homme moyen, literally translated means “the ideal human”. 
16 Ergodic theory is a branch of mathematical statistics and probability theory. 
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IAV and IEV research are not asymptotically equivalent (Molenaar, 2004). Ergodic 
theorems assert that analysis of interindividual variation will fail to correspond to the 
pattern of intraindividual variation when: a mean trend changes over time, a covariance 
structure changes over time, or when a process occurs differently for different members 
of the population. Unfortunately, these are precisely the conditions that characterise much 
psychological research (Krauss, 2008; Molenaar, 2004; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010).  
A plethora of empirical findings back up the theorems of ergodic mathematics. For 
example, Borkenau and Ostendorf (1998) had 22 participants self report items indicative 
of the Big 5 factors of personality, daily, over a period of 90 days. Though substantial 
consistency was evidenced for the factor structure of longitudinal rotations that had been 
averaged across all participants, the five-factor model only fitted the intraindividual 
organisation of psychological dispositions for fewer than 10% of the individual 
participants. That is, for most participants the supposed 5 factors of personality gave way 
to 2, 3, 6 and even 8 factor structures (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1998). Similar findings 
have been obtained by Cervone (2005), Cervone and Shoda, (1999), Epstein, (2010), 
Grice (2004), and Grice, Jackson, and McDaniel (2006). 
To understand how intraindividual tendencies can fail to fit the five-factor model, 
consider someone who regularly experiences positive affect and acts impulsively 
whenever they are not feeling self-conscious. Positive affectivity is a facet of 
Extraversion, whereas impulsivity and self-consciousness are facets of Neuroticism. As 
Extraversion and Neuroticism are independent dimensions, the 5 factor model does not 
anticipate robust within-person correlations between positive affect and the other two 
attributes. Moreover, impulsivity and low self consciousness are at opposite ends of the 
Neuroticism dimension, and thus correlate negatively, not positively (Cervone & Shoda, 
1999). This is doubly troubling, for not only may many models be inadequately fit to 
individuals but doing so might also obscure other items of interest within the data 
(Cervone, 2005; Epstein, 2010). 
That IEV approaches fail to elucidate and explain intraindividual variation should 
come as little surprise. As Harré (1998) notes taxonomic, classificatory concepts are of an 
incorrect logical type to serve as explanations within the domain of psychology. This is 
due to the fact that most latent variables are conceptualised as unchanging static 
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constructs. Because these variables cannot covary with their supposed effects, the 
premise that a position on a latent variable distribution causes a subject’s item response is 
fallacious (Borsboom, 2003, 2005; Krauss, 2008).  
Summary 
Despite the vitriolic rhetoric, the criticisms of IAV research are unfounded. The focus on 
direct and systematic replication, repeated measurement of variables, and visual analysis 
of data are the key advantages of IAV research that make it an efficient, scientific tool for 
investigating human behaviour and making causal attributions. Far from being a chaotic, 
non-generalisable, antiscience undertaking, the greater intimacy, understanding, and 
control of psychological phenomena afforded by IAV research leads to the construction 
of valid and generalised psychological knowledge. As Sidman (1960) has emphasised, 
“Experience has taught us that precision of control leads to more extensive generalization 
of data” (p.152). 
By contrast, the generalisations generated by IEV research, which are so often 
accorded great significance within psychology, are premised on shaky ideological 
foundations. In generalising beyond the boundaries afforded by samples of narrow, 
homogenised, cohorts, IEV conclusions can be overstated and misattributed. Though 
aggregating can increase measures of situational consistency, casting individual variation 
into the statistical darkness known as error variance (Cronbach, 1957) obfuscates patterns 
of consistent, idiosyncratic personality dispositions. Ergodic theory backed by empirical 
research show that psychological processes are in the main non-ergodic; the individual 
cannot be described by the aggregate. As Harré (1998) succinctly notes: “To say that a 
chimpanzee is a primate does not explain anything about its characteristics” (p.80-81).  
Conclusion 
 A Redundant Debate 
Though Allport (1937) is often credited with introducing the concepts idiographic and 
nomothetic into the psychology lexicon, it was in fact Munsterberg (1899/1994) who first 
used the terms in psychology. The genesis of these concepts, however, can be attributed 
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to Windelband (1884/1998), from whom both Munsterberg and Allport borrowed the 
terms. Unfortunately, issues of translation and inconsistent distinctions have seen the 
commonly interpreted meaning of these terms drift far from the ideological mooring of 
Windelband’s original conception. Far from being a harmonious and consistent 
application of two complementary modes of scientific endeavour, the terms idiographic 
and nomothetic have been erroneously associated with various antagonistic issues 
concerning the study of groups and individuals, qualitative versus quantitative research 
methods, personality traits, and the status of psychology as a science. 
The Fragmentation of Psychology’s Research Tradition 
The most serious consequence for psychological science to emerge from the 
terminological debate has been the fragmentation of the psychological research tradition. 
Early psychological research methodology was borrowed and adapted from various 
scientific disciplines and characterised by a state of flux. Whereas the Wundtian school 
focused on introspective, perceptive, and sociocultural elements within a person, the 
Galtonian paradigm’s prime concern was for mental measurement and comparison 
between individuals.  
By the 1920s the Galtonian paradigm had begun to emerge as the dominant approach 
and its emergence was facilitated by educational and military demand for practical 
applications which shaped laboratory research practices. This trend was exacerbated with 
the demand for social investigation emerging from government and private research 
foundations, and with the advances afforded by revolutionaries such as Fisher and 
Stevens. By the 1950s, the study of IEV via the statistical aggregation of groups of 
individuals had become the authoritative research approach in psychology. To this day, 
IEV research remains, if anything, an even more dominant research tradition with 
journals historically associated with IAV research wandering from their conceptual roots 
by employing aggregated statistical methodology. 
A Nomothetic Illusion 
In striking contrast with Windelband’s original intention, IEV research in psychology 
today is characterised by a reductive framework in which nomotheticity has been taken to 
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be synonymous with ergodicity. That is, IEV and IAV are presumed to be equivalent: 
over time, between samples and universal populations, and between groups and 
individuals within such groups. These assumptions are completely untenable as the 
theorems of ergodic mathematics and a legion of empirical research demonstrate. 
Psychological samples are not generally representative of populations, psychological 
phenomena are not static over time, and individuals vary in ways that cannot be captured 
by group statistics. In contrast, IAV research with its focus on replication, control, and 
repeated measurement of variables is uniquely suited to discovering the consistent, 
idiosyncratic patterns of human variability missed by IEV methods, and well as the 
accumulation of robust, generalisable, psychological knowledge. 
An Addressable Imbalance 
That IEV research does not, and cannot investigate, test, imply or evaluate causal 
accounts of individual behaviour is clear, for: “our theories are formulated in a within-
subjects sense, but the models we apply are often based solely on between-subjects 
comparison” (Luce, 1997, cited in Borsboom, 2005, p.83). Both the logic and evidence 
presented above illustrate that there can be no justification for assuming that relations 
among individuals are consistent with relations within individuals; they are not the same. 
The defining characteristic of man is his individuality (Allport, 1937) and by “stripping 
the person of all his troublesome particularities, general psychology has destroyed his 
essential nature.” (Allport, 1967, p. 549).  
Meehl (1992) remarked that "no statistical procedure should be treated as a mechanical 
truth generator" (p. 152). The pathological and one-sided fascination with the aggregate 
at the expense of the individual can, at best, result only in impoverished understanding of 
psychological phenomena. These sentiments are endorsed by Loftus (1996) who opined: 
“What we do, I sometime think, is akin to trying to build a violin using a stone mallet and 
a chain saw. The tool-to-task fit is not very good, and, as a result, we wind up building a 
lot of poor quality violins.” (p.161). 
As Kluckhohn and Murray (1953) have expressed the issue, every human is in certain 
aspects like all other humans, like some other humans, and in other ways like no other 
human. If research methods truly are to be the mortar that binds the various psychology 
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sub-disciplines together (Stanovich, 2004), then the imbalance between IEV and IAV 
research must be redressed to accommodate investigation of all dimensions and levels of 
human variability. Failing to do so only further threatens the foundation on which 
psychology’s quest for relevant, veracious, and cumulative scientific knowledge is 
premised.   
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Chapter 5: Observation Oriented Modelling 
Overview 
Outline 
Metaphysical Misgivings 
Observation Orientated Modelling (OOM) is a novel methodology for conceptualising 
and evaluating psychological data created by James Grice in response to the metaphysical 
issues plaguing psychology’s major research tradition (Grice, 2011). Citing such 
luminaries as Meehl, Bakan, and Cohen, along with many of the arguments detailed 
above, Grice asserts that the predominately positivist research tradition that characterises 
contemporary psychology has thwarted accumulation of genuinely scientific knowledge 
about people. OOM is thus advanced as a unique alternative for explaining patterns of 
observations in terms of their causal structure, in stark contrast with the variable and 
parameter orientated approach of psychology’s prevailing research paradigm.  
Grice’s (2011) view echoes the earlier sentiments of editors of 24 scientific journals 
who asserted that traditional, variable-orientated, sample-based, research strategies were 
ill-suited to accounting for the complex causal processes undergirding psychological 
phenomena (NIMH consortium of editors on development and psychopathology, 2000). 
Barrett (2008) best exemplifies the consensus criticism of these strategies: “Instead of 
simply dealing with this state of affairs as scientists might, which is to think about why it 
is proving so difficult and perhaps concentrate more on methods for establishing some 
decent levels of predictive accuracy of whatever we hold as “important,” 
psychometricians have instead created a self-sustaining illusion that data-model-driven 
statistical complexity equates to more accurate science. Where is the evidence for this 
proposition?” (p.81). 
Philosophical Underpinnings 
In contrast with the positivist philosophy of traditional psychological research methods, 
OOM is premised on a moderate philosophical realism exemplified by Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas (Grice, 2011). Broadly described, such realism holds that that there is 
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an independently existing natural world which humans are able to successfully cognize 
via observational methods, and that such knowledge is a reliable guide to individual and 
social actions. Seven principles of OOM result, whereby primacy is given to real, 
accurate, repeated, observable events and researchers are encouraged to think through the 
lens of an integrated model that incorporates statistical outliers but avoids aggregation 
and population inferences, except in a limited fashion. In Grice’s (2011) own words: 
“…observation oriented modelling shifts the focus of analysis away from computed 
aggregates such as means and variances onto the observation themselves. In other words, 
the focus is shifted to the people, specific behaviours, animals, things, events, etc., under 
investigation…The psychologist instead worries less about fulfilling untenable 
assumptions… and thinks more about the patterns of ordered observations relative to a 
competing perspective of chance” (p.40). 
Methodology 
Deep Structure 
At the core of OOM are the deep structures of qualitatively and quantitatively ordered 
observations. Such structures are obtained by translating data elements into binary form. 
For example, the deep structure of biological sex can be represented “1 0” for females 
and “0 1” for males. Similarly, in considering a 5-point Likert scale with highly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, and highly agree categories, a highly disagree response would be 
recorded as “1 0 0 0 0” whereas an agree response would be coded “0 0 0 1 0”. Multiple 
observations can be then recorded in standard matrix convention:  
 
1 0  0 1 0 0 0 
0 1  0 0 0 0 1 
1 0  1 0 0 0 0 
0 1  0 0 0 1 0 
1 0  0 0 1 0 0 
0 1  0 1 0 0 0 
Gender = 6Y2     Likert = 6X5 
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Procrustes Rotation 
In matrix form, deep structures can be manipulated according to the rules of matrix 
algebra which allows for addition, subtraction, and other logical operations such as if, and, 
not, etc. The primary mathematical technique employed in OOM analysis, however, is 
referred to as Binary Procrustes Rotation, a modified form of Procrustes rotation first 
published by Green (1952)17. In OOM, the observed categories such as people, 
behaviours, and actions are always assigned to the rows of deep structure matrices 
whereas the units of observations are assigned to the columns. The goal of the binary 
Procrustes rotation then, is to align the column (units) in such a way that 1s in the target 
matrix (Likert response) are maximised with co-occurrence of 1s in the conforming 
matrix (gender). A process of normalisation is then used to ensure values in the final, 
fully rotated matrix do not exceed 1, and preserves the scale of the original deep 
structures.  
Classification Strength Index 
In an ideal outcome, the transformed values of the conforming matrix will perfectly 
match the values in the target matrix. This is not always the case, however, with possible 
values ranging between 0, no match at all, and 1, perfect agreement. The largest value in 
each row is used as an indicator of the extent to which the rotation clearly discriminated 
between the various units in each observation and is termed the Classification Strength 
Index (CSI).  
Percent Correct Classification Index 
Though the CSI reveals the discrimination between units afforded by the rotation, it does 
not indicate the degree of similitude between rows of the target and conforming matrices. 
Consider a case in which a row of a conforming matrix results in values of 0, .50, and .88 
but where a target matrix possesses values of 0, 1, 0. Clearly, in this instance the 
classification is erroneous indicating that a better match was obtained for a different 
variable. The Percent Correct Classification Index (PCC) provides the number of correct 
matches obtained between the conforming and target structure rows with a higher value 
demonstrating better similitude between cause and effect (Grice, 2011). 
                                                           
17 Hurley, Cattell, and Schoneman are also credited with developing and popularising the technique (Grice, 
2011).  
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C-Value 
The success, or not, of the classifications within an OOM analysis raises an important 
question, namely, what constitutes success? Though 100% is obviously the gold standard, 
should 66% be considered an impressive outcome? To help answer this question, the 
OOM software employs a resampling procedure that involves randomly shuffling the 
rows of the conforming deep structure, applying the Binary Procrustes Rotation, and 
recalculating the PCC value. This process is repeated numerous times (500-1000) and a 
probability statistic is generated, termed the chance value (c-value), that reflects the 
frequency with which resampling provides results at least as accurate as the initial 
observed data. Low c-values thus provide an indication of the uniqueness particular to a 
set of observations (Grice, 2011).  
Multigram 
Bakan (1966), citing Tukey (1962), pointed out that statistical procedures can “take our 
attention away from the data, which constitute the ultimate base for any inferences which 
we might make” (Bakan, 1966, p.436). Heeding these words, and in concert with the 
visual analysis methods commonly employed in IAV research, a multi-level frequency 
histogram, or simply multigram, is also utilised to aid the inspection, analysis, and 
evaluation of psychological data. A multigram is created using units of the target deep 
structure as columns with units of the conforming deep structure represented as rows 
(Grice, 2011). As can be seen in the example below, red bars are used to represent 
incorrectly classified observations and green to correctly classified observations.  
Generalisation 
As noted above, the primary concern in OOM is the focus on phenomena. As such, 
representative statistical aggregates for hypothetical population parameters are given less 
consideration, if not ignored completely. Generalisability of findings, in harmony with 
IAV approaches, is the result of replication and theoretical considerations: “It is 
important to point out here that the psychologist’s scientific desire to generalise…is 
satisfied not through an appeal to population parameters but to replication and theory” 
(Grice, 2011, p.40). 
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Example 
Matrix Output 
In order to flesh out the concepts listed above, consider the two hypothetical matrices 
below that represent the deep structures of gender (target matrix) and depression ratings 
(conforming matrix) on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3, extremely happy to +3, 
heavily depressed. Combined, they are represented in a transformational matrix. For 
example, the top left hand figures, 2 and 3, of the transformation matrix represents the 
frequency with which 1s were found for males endorsing -3 and -2 ratings.   
 
1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 0 
0 1  0 0 0 0 0 1 0  3 0 
1 0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
1 0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
0 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 
0 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 2 
1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 3 
1 0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0    
0 1  0 0 0 0 0 1 0    
0 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 1    
Gender = 10Y2  Depression = 10X7  Trans = 7T2 = 7X’10 10Y2  
Normalising the transformation matrix by columns and then by rows results in the fully 
rotated matrix which is compared to the original target matrix. As can be seen below, 
they are identical indicating that 7 unit deep structure depression ratings could be 
conformed and reduced to their 2 unit gender deep structures. That is, gender is the causal 
factor precipitating depression in this model.  
 
1 0  1 0 
0 1  0 1 
1 0  1 0 
1 0  1 0 
0 1  0 1 
0 1  0 1 
1 0  1 0 
1 0  1 0 
0 1  0 1 
0 1  0 1 
Fully Rotated Matrix = 10X7 7T2   Gender = 10Y2 
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OOM Statistical Output 
In OOM, output from the results are as documented below. In noting the strong 
classification strengths of each observation, the high percent classification results, and the 
low c-value, it can be inferred that there is strong support for the model that gender 
causes depression. Visually, this is confirmed by the multigram in Figure 3 which shows 
clear separation of distributions. 
Individual Classification Results 
 
     Classification Result 
     |  Classification Strength 
     |  |    Target Deep Structure 
     |  |    |     Classified Deep Structure 
     |  |    |     |     Conforming Deep Structure 
     |  |    |     |           |           
 obs_1  C 1.00    Male    Male    Extremely Happy 
 obs_2  C 1.00   Female   Female       Depressed 
 obs_3  C 1.00    Male    Male         Happy 
 obs_4  C 1.00    Male    Male         Happy 
 obs_5  C 1.00   Female   Female   Heavily Depressed 
 obs_6  C 1.00   Female   Female   Heavily Depressed 
 obs_7  C 1.00    Male    Male    Extremely Happy 
 obs_8  C 1.00    Male    Male         Happy 
 obs_9  C 1.00   Female   Female       Depressed 
obs_10  C 1.00   Female   Female   Heavily Depressed 
 
Note. C = Correctly Classified, I = Incorrect, A = Ambiguous. 
 
 
 
Randomization Results 
 
 Observed Percent Correct Classified : 100.00 
 
     Number of Randomized Trials : 100.00 
    Minimum Random Percent Correct : 40.00 
    Maximum Random Percent Correct : 100.00 
    Values >= Observed Proportion :  1.00 
            Model c-value :  0.01 
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Figure 3: Multigram depicting depression results by gender. 
Evaluation 
Advantages 
OOM and the Measurement Problem 
The primary advantage of using OOM for the evaluation of psychological data is that it 
doesn’t rely on restrictive and unrealistic assumptions. By employing binary translations 
of data and focusing solely on the structured patterns of causal phenomena, issues 
concerning the measurement problem, NHST, and IEV research are avoided. For 
example, whereas most traditional approaches to psychological measurement dubiously 
presume all psychological variables posses quantitative structure, which allow for 
analysis by linear statistical techniques such as factor analysis and structural equation 
modelling, OOM does not. In such cases, conclusions from OOM research attain a 
legitimacy that cannot be attained using other traditional measurement techniques (Grice, 
2011). 
OOM and NHST 
The overly restrictive assumptions and resulting criticisms underpinning NHST are also 
evaded when employing an OOM approach to research. Assumptions such as linearity, 
equal population variances, and constraints pertinent to power analysis such as sample 
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size requirements are all germane examples that are irrelevant to OOM considerations 
(Grice, 2011). With fewer restrictions to violate, OOM affords a realistic, flexible 
rationale to modelling and appraising psychological phenomena that cannot be attained 
with prevailing research practices such as NHST.  
OOM and IEV 
Similarly, in dealing with phenomena at the individual observation level, drawbacks of 
IEV research approaches are sidestepped. Mathematical theorems concerning the 
ergodicity of psychological variables are respected. Additionally, in recognising and 
valuing outlying results, rather than interpreting such results as uninterpretable noise 
(Grice, 2011), and by employing methods of visual analysis, patterns of unique causal 
variability can be uncovered that are missed by IEV strategies.  
Flexibility and Efficiency 
Although OOM’s strength is its ability to use discrete countable qualities, continuous 
qualities can also be analysed (Grice, 2011). When combined with the rich analysis 
options afforded by OOM, such as model observation separation and pairwise rotation 
analyses, OOM can replace Chi Square tests, t-Tests, correlation analysis, ANOVAs, 
MANOVAs, bivariate multiple regression and item comparison procedures of traditional 
statistical inference (Grice, 2011). By avoiding the activity required in learning and 
verifying assumptions, transforming data, and pondering statistical significance of results 
used in traditional statistical analysis, OOM can greatly simplify and economise the data 
analytic process (Grice, 2011). 
Contentions  
Matrix Restrictions 
Though OOM is rightly seen as a flexible, efficient method for analysing the causal 
patterns within psychological data, it does have limitations that researchers need to be 
cognizant of. The first limitation concerns the nature of matrix algebra employed in OOM. 
At least one dimension (row or column) must be consistent to both the target and 
conforming matrices to allow the Binary Procrustes rotation to take place (Grice, 2011). 
For instance, though a 2x6 matrix could be rotated with a 10x6 matrix, a 4x3 matrix 
could not be conformed to a 2x5 matrix.  
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Similarly, it should be noted that rotations are asymmetric. That is, switching target and 
conforming matrices and rotating will give different results to a reversed ordering. Small 
number of units will result in ambiguous classifications more often when conformed to 
large number of units (Grice, 2011). For both these reasons, therefore, the selection and 
ordering of the units and variables of observation are a prime consideration.  
Binary Multiplication and Division  
Similarly, multiplication and division are operations that cannot be supported in binary 
form by OOM (Grice, 2011). In contrast with logical, addition, and subtraction processes, 
all multiplication and division of data elements must be performed before a binary 
translation occurs. In so doing, the assumptions of quantity underpinning such operations 
must be met. In this case OOM is as constrained as other traditional approaches. 
Resampling and the C-value 
As highlighted above, a key strength of OOM is the relative lack of assumptions intrinsic 
to it. That’s not to say it has no assumptions, however. For example, three assumptions 
underpin the randomised resampling test, namely (1) that conforming observations are 
independent, (2) that target observations are independent, and (3) the conforming 
observations are independent of the target observations. Although minimal when 
compared with assumptions of NHST, verification of these conditions should take place, 
with violations of independence potentially resulting in erroneous inferences derived 
from the c-value.  
It should also be noted that as the size of the data set diminishes so too does the value 
derived from the c-value, with fewer random permutations available from which 
comparison may be obtained. Even with large data sets and verified assumptions, 
however, an inferential conservatism is warranted. A number quantifying the probability 
of evidence should not be conflated with the strength of evidence (Haig, 2011). To do so 
is reminiscent of p-values and the effect size fallacy elucidated earlier in the NHST 
chapter.  
 Magnitude 
A similar inferential caution is required in regards to issues of magnitude. Though OOM 
preserves the scaling of original data in binary transformation and rotation of matrices, it 
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is important that quantity considerations should also be attended to by researchers in 
addition to focusing on ordered patterns. For example, it is perfectly possible for two 
conformed matrices from two different rotations to possess the same structure. However, 
the magnitudes expressed by each matrix may be entirely different. Descriptive statistics 
are available within the OOM software and should be used where necessary to 
supplement conclusions drawn from OOM. 
Conclusion 
The Primacy of the Real  
OOM is a new method for evaluating psychological data created in response to 
shortcomings identified with psychology’s dominant research tradition. In contrast with 
this dominant positivist tradition, OOM is premised on philosophical realism. As such, 
OOM grants primacy to real, accurate, repeated, observations rather than abstract 
statistical aggregates, and allows for greater insight into, and better explanation of, 
patterns of observations in terms of their causal structure.  
Conformity of Ordered Structures 
Using binary translation of data elements, data matrices are created which are aligned to 
one another via a Binary Procrustes Rotation. The CSI reflects the degree to which units 
(columns) in the final, transformed, rotated matrix cohere with units of the original target 
matrix, whereas the PCC reflects the consistency between rows of the conforming and 
target matrices. A c-value indicates the degree of uniqueness of generated results against 
a competing perspective of chance. These statistical outputs, in conjunction with visual 
analysis of results provided by a multigram, along with replication procedures, are the 
primary mechanisms by which causal structure is inferred, and generalised within OOM. 
 Assumptive Parsimony  
An OOM approach to the analysis and interpretation of psychological data holds many 
advantages over traditional research methodologies. The primary benefit concerns the 
dearth of assumptions that undergird OOM. With few postulates concerning the nature of 
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error, quantitative structure, linearity, and ergodicity, OOM overcomes many of the 
troubling aspects intrinsic to traditional approaches as documented in the measurement 
problem, the use of NHST, and the nature of IEV research. OOM, therefore, offers a 
robust, economical approach to data analysis that can replace many other statistical 
techniques employed in psychology’s dominant, variable-orientated, sample-based 
research paradigm. 
Data Intimacy 
Though not without methodological caveats and restrictions, such as binary 
multiplication and division, most caveats relate to researcher utilisation of OOM rather 
than weaknesses fundamental to the method itself. Indeed, it could be argued in several 
instances that several of the restrictions, in fact, afford better research outcomes. For 
example, in adhering to the constraints of matrix algebra and the attendant evaluation of 
the units of analysis, researchers are forced to stay “close to the observations as they are 
ordered” (Grice, 2011, p.173). As a consequence, a greater intimacy with experimental 
data is achieved that can facilitate a better understanding of research phenomena (Perone, 
1999). 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Issues in Contemporary Psychology 
The Measurement Problem 
Philosophical monism, quantification, and practicalism were three characteristics that 
united and typified early approaches to psychological measurement taken by pioneers 
such as Fechner, Cattell, and Thorndike. Nevertheless, criticism of such approaches 
abounded, reaching its zenith in the Ferguson Committee findings of 1940. Far from 
signalling the demise of psychological measurement, however, the convening of the 
Ferguson Committee can be seen as the crucible from which contemporary psychological 
measurement was born. By operationalising a representative theory of numerical 
assessment, and binding measurement to statistical procedures in response to the 
Ferguson Committee criticisms, Stevens revolutionised psychological measurement. 
  This revolution was unfortunate, for Stevens’ formulation fails to meet the axioms of 
true quantitative measurement originating with Euclid and formalised by Holder. A 
similar conclusion can be drawn for Rasch modelling. Though, resembling, in style, the 
legitimate derived measurement practice of conjoint measurement theory, in substance 
Rasch modelling falls short of true quantitative measurement. The theory of conjoint 
measurement represents a significant achievement in mathematical psychology. However, 
it is in reality difficult to apply to many psychological attributes. This is an argument 
understood and expanded upon by Trendler (2009), who cites the lack of control afforded 
by psychological apparatus as the primary weakness retarding the accurate, quantitative 
measurement of psychological variables.  
It should be noted that there have been measurement successes in the field of 
perception, such as loudness and brightness. However, the vast majority of psychological 
chracterisitcs have never been properly quantified and, thus, have never been properly 
measured. Though many psychological properties may in fact be quantitative, inferences 
from psychological measurement are of uncertain and/or dubious scientific utility without 
investigating and demonstrating direct or derived additivity. The results of failing to meet 
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this requirement are forcefully delineated by Barrett (2008): “The real-world 
consequences of this systematic aversion to properly considering the presumed 
[measurement] status of a psychological variable is that our journals are now filled with 
studies that are largely trivial exemplars of mostly inaccurate explanations of phenomena. 
Nothing seems to have changed since Lykken’s similar observations of this phenomenon 
back in 1991.” (p. 79-80). 
Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
The current hybridised statistical methodology employed in psychological science is a 
result of pioneering work by Gosset, and a blend of statistical strategies of Fisher, and 
Neyman and Pearson. Such an amalgamation is, however, philosophically untenable and 
logically invalid. The assumptions underpinning the methodology are restrictive, ill-
suited for application to many psychological phenomena, and often go unverified. The 
consequence is a fatally flawed technique that Bayesian arguments, Meehl’s conjecture, 
and various other criticisms demonstrate. 
Despite such deficiencies, NHST remains to this day the most popular statistical 
methodology employed in psychology and many social sciences. Attempts at reform, 
such as changes to journal editorial polices and concerted campaigns for abandonming 
NHST in favour of other approaches, have done little to dent the pathological over-
reliance of NHST among psychologists. This situation is aggravated by orders of 
magnitude when research showing the paucity of understanding of NHST, and 
concomitant resulting fallacies displayed by researchers, is considered. Though NHST 
can be used as a means of assessing sampling variability, power considerations and the 
advantages of confidence intervals almost entirely preclude, or obviate, the legitimate 
application of NHST to sampling assessment within psychology. 
Twenty years on from Lykken’s (1991) imploration to give away “the nearly futile null 
hypothesis testing to which we have become addicted” (p.37), NHST remains the most 
popular, misunderstood, misapplied, and misused methodology in psychology. The 
questionable quality of much psychological research that relies solely, or primarily, on 
NHST for empirical inference is but another reason “why so much social science has 
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turned out to be no more than transient description of never-to-be-reencountered 
situations, easy to contradict with almost any replication” (Wright, 1997, p.35).  
The Granularity of Research Methods 
The distinction between IEV and IAV research within psychology is often characterised 
as a nomothetic-idiographic contrast. This is, however, erroneous resulting from 
mistranslation and incongruent utilisation of the terms idiographic and nomothetic 
originally conceived by Windelband. The triumph of the Galtonian paradigm over the 
Wundtian paradigm, synonymous with statistical advances and practical imperatives, has 
resulted in a fracturing of psychology’s research tradition. Today, this schism is gravely 
imbalanced with the overwhelming dominance of group-based, statistical aggregates 
evident even amongst journals with a traditionally IAV foundation. 
This imbalance is deeply troubling for as theorems of ergodic mathematics and 
empirical research demonstrate, only in restricted cases can the individual be accurately 
described by the aggregate. That people differ in patterns of cross-situational consistency, 
in ways that cannot be captured with IEV statistics, has been illustrated by numerous 
researchers. This contrasts sharply with empirical work highlighting the robust, 
cumulative, generalisations afforded by IAV approaches.  
Depending on the level of analysis, humans can be seen to resemble all, some, and no 
other humans. In focusing almost completely on the general, psychology has done little, 
theoretically and empirically, to capture the idiosyncratic variability inherent within 
individuals. As such, an incomplete and impoverished understanding of human 
psychology currently exists. The point is again understood and underscored in Lykken’s 
(1991) critique: “To the extent that our brains are running different programs, no one 
nomothetic psychological theory is going to be able to account for all of us.” (p.17). 
Conclusion and Solution 
Continued Cult Science 
The three issues with psychology’s dominant research tradition examined in this thesis 
were all cogently highlighted by Lykken in his classic 1991 critique. As the preceding 
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chapters demonstrate, little has changed since its publication. The pathological 
fascination with “the sizeless stare of statistical significance” (Ziliak & McCloskey, 
2008), coupled with the failure to deal with issues of quantification and the imbalance 
between IEV and IAV research means many areas of psychology are still practicing 
“cargo-cult science”. Twenty years of continually slow progress on from Lykken, a lot, 
therefore, remains wrong with psychology’s research tradition.  
Levels of Analysis 
A particularly troubling aspect with the foregoing is that with some overlap, each of these 
three issue can be seen to address different “levels” of psychology’s research tradition. 
The IEV versus IAV issue is concerned with description, focuses on observations, and 
addresses matters of how best to perceive and evaluate data. The NHST issue is at a 
higher level concerning methodological application and inferences derived from the 
observations at the descriptive level. Similarly, the quantification issue can be seen to be 
at a still higher level focusing on meta-level philosophical issues underpinning the 
methodology. Thus, it is not just one level of psychology’s dominant research tradition 
that requires attention but indeed every level.  
Practicality Over Philosophy  
That practicalism, buttressed by the misuse of mathematics, has overridden philosophical 
sensibilities explains much of the current situation in psychology. For example, the 
practical demand for psychological testing coupled with Stevens’ scales of measurement, 
has seen the issue of quantification disappear from psychology’s radar. Similarly, the 
practical pressures for mental and educational applications of psychological knowledge 
that initiated group testing and averaging, in direct opposition to the theorems of ergodic 
mathematics, has resulted in the serious IEV/IAV research imbalance and the consequent 
impoverished understanding of individuals. In the same manner, the practicalist 
imperatives behind the inference revolution and the hybridisation of Fisher, and Neyman 
and Pearson’s statistical methodologies has seen the mindless, pathological application of 
NHST become the method of choice for statistical inference in psychology. As Danziger 
(1990) succinctly expressed it, psychology has demonstrated the “tendency for practical 
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technology to usurp the name of science” (p.128). Valsiner (2006) hihglights the 
consequences of such practical usurpation: “The result is predictable—a mindless 
accumulation of empirical publications in increasingly narrow ‘research fields’. The latter 
are set by conventions rather than by theoretical needs. Psychology as science would 
probably suffer no loss if the overwhelming majority of empirical papers that are 
currently published never saw print.” (p.604). 
OOM Not Doom 
It might be thought, from a reading of this thesis that no psychological measurement is 
possible, that IEV research has no value, that commonly used statistical methods are 
inadequate, and that, therefore, all psychological research is entirely without merit. 
However, this would be an incorrect inference. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with 
pursuing a sample-based, approach to IEV measurement that utilises aggregated linear 
statistical analysis if such an approach represents the best strategy for answering a given 
demographic research question. For other questions, however, other approaches may be 
required. Indeed, the KAPA model (Cervone, 2004), the theory of conjoint measurement 
(Luce & Tukey, 1964), and the Violence Risk Assessment Guide (Webster, Harris, Rice, 
Cormier, & Quinsey, 1994) are germane examples that renounced traditional research 
approaches because traditional research methodologies could not generate relevant 
empirical insight.  
The challenges posed by the preceding issues result largely from the mindless, 
ritualised, one-size-fits-all application of traditional research approaches and methods to 
psychological research, without regard for relevant conceptual and philosophical 
considerations. Created in direct response to criticisms of the prevailing research 
practices, Observation Oriented Modelling is a flexible, efficient procedure for detecting 
and attributing causal relations amongst patterns of phenomena that can replace a variety 
of traditional statistical methodologies.  
Being founded on philosophical realism, and focusing on phenomena at the individual 
level, OOM can reveal patterns of unique causal variability that are missed by IEV 
strategies. With few restrictive assumptions to violate, OOM affords a more realistic, 
flexible rationale to modelling and appraising psychological phenomena that cannot be 
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attained with prevailing research practices such as NHST. Similarly, in dealing with 
patterns of ordered structure, and without dubiously presuming all psychological 
variables posses quantitative structure, conclusions from OOM research attain a 
legitimacy that cannot be afforded using other traditional measurement techniques. OOM 
thus represents a unique, powerful addition to the researcher toolbox for helping to 
remedy “what’s wrong with psychology” (Lykken, 1991, p.3).
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Appendix 1 
Holder’s Axioms 
A binary, greater than relation upon the levels of an attribute (symbolized by >) is 
1. Transitive if and only if for any levels a, b, and c, if a>b and b>c, then a>c; 
2. Asymmetric if and only if for any levels a and b, if a>b, then not (b>a); and 
3. Connected if and only if for any levels a and b (a _= b), either a>b or b>a 
(where a, b, and c are any levels of the attribute); 
4. for every pair of levels a and b, one and only one of the following is true: 
(i) a = b; (ii) there exists a level c such that a = b+c; (iii) there exists a level c such that b 
= a+c;  
5. For any levels a and b, a+b>a; 
6. For any levels a and b, a+b = b+a; 
7. For any levels a, b, and c, a+(b+c) = (a+b)+c; 
8. For any a and b, there is a c such that c = a+b. 
9. for any a, there is a b such that b<a. 
10. For every nonempty class of levels having an upper bound, there is a least upper 
bound (where for any levels a, b, and c, a+b = c if and only if c is entirely composed of 
discrete parts, a and b). 
 
From Michell (1997)
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Appendix 2 
Axioms of Conjoint Measurement 
Consider two sets of objects, V and X, where V = {t, u, v} and X = {x, y, z). These sets 
are disjoint as they do not share any common elements. They may be able to be measured 
if they relate to a third variable in certain ways. The elements of V and X can pair to form 
the set C. The elements of C are the ordered pairs (t, x), (t, y), (t, z), (u, x), (u, y), (u, z), 
(v, x), (v, y), (v, z), and hence C is the Cartesian product of V and X. C = [V x X, ≥ ] is a 
conjoint measurement empirical structure if and only if the elements of C satisfy the 
following axioms: 
 
C1. Weak order. Given C = [V x X, ≥] and the ordered pairs (t, x) and (u, x), then V and 
X are weakly ordered if and only if: 
• For t and u in V and (u, x) ≥ (t, x) then u ≥ t. 
• For X, y ≥ x is defined similarly. 
• The relation ‘≥’ is transitive and connected. 
 
C2. Independence. The relation ‘≥’ upon V × X is independent if and only if: 
• For t and u in V and x in X then (u, x) ≥ (t, x) is implied for every element w in X 
such that (u, w) ≥ (t, w). 
• For x and y in X and v in V then (v, y) ≥ (v, x) implies for every element s in V that 
(s, y) ≥ (s, x). 
 
C3. Double cancellation. The relation ‘≥’ upon V × X satisfies if and only if for every t, u 
and v in V and x, y and z in X then: 
If (u, x) ≥ (t, y) 
and (v, y) ≥ (u, z) 
therefore (v, x) ≥ (t, z) 
 
C4. Solvability. The relation ‘≥’ upon V × X is solvable if for any three of the four 
elements t and u in V and x and y in V, the fourth exists such that the inequality (u, x) ≥ (t, 
y) is solved such that (u, x) ~ (t, y). 
 
C5. Archimedean condition. Let there exist the elements t, u, v and s in V and x, y, z and 
w in X. If u - t ≤ s - v and y - x ≤ w - z, then for any natural number n, V and X are 
Archimedean if and only if n(u – t) ≥ s - v and n(y - x) ≥ w - z. 
 
If all axioms C1–C5 hold, then for t and v in V, x and z in X there exist real valued 
functions фV and фX such that:  
(v, x) ≥ (t, z) ↔ фV (v) + фX(x) ≥ фV(t) фX(z) 
 
From Kyngdon (2008) 
